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Uniform Commercial Code Annual Survey:
General Provisions; Sales, Bulk Transfers, and
Documents of Title
By David Frisch,* Fairfax Leary, fr.,** and john D. Wladis***

GENERAL PROVISIONS
CONFLICT OF LAWS
A drafting compromise by the U.C.C. drafters in section 1-105 dictated the
state having an "appropriate relation" to govern choice of law problems in the
absence of a contractual clause, and if there is a clause, a "reasonable relation"
to the state selected. The purpose was to leave choice of law problems to the
general rules of the common law. 1 Thus, some courts in breach of warranty
cases continue to apply the tests of "place of injury" for personal injury suits
and "place of contracting" for what does not involve personal injury, 2 while
others look for the state having the most "significant contacts" with the transaction.3
When there is a choice of law clause, two approaches continue to be used:
"reasonable relation" and "appropriate relation." Reasonable relation is held to
require less contact by the state selected by the parties than appropriate relation.
It is questionable, however, whether the selection merely serves to effect an
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Mr. Frisch is a member of the Rhode Island bar and Associate Professor of Law at The Delaware
Law School of Widener University .
.. Mr. Leary is a member of the Pennsylvania, New York, and District of Columbia bars and
Distinguished Senior Professor of Law at the Delaware Law School of Widener University .
... Mr. Wladis is a member of the New York bar and Associate Professor of Law at the Delaware
Law School at Widener University.
1. Professor Leary was present at some of the discussions among the drafters and makes the
statement from memory.
2. Morgan v. Mar-Bel, Inc., 614 F. Supp. 438, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1271 (N.D.
Ga. 1985) (injury in Georgia, place of contracting Florida, plaintiff loses under Georgia's privity
requirement).
3. See, e.g., Travenol Laboratories, Inc. v. Zotal Ltd., 394 Mass. 95, 474 N.E.2d 1070, 40
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 487 (1985) (law of Massachusetts having more significant contacts
applied to prevent Massachusetts buyer's setoff of damage claim in action for price rather than the
allegedly contra rule of Israel, in which seller was located. Goods were sold "F.O.B. Cambridge,
Massachusetts." Court ruled that established conflicts principles establish, for U.C.C. purposes, the
appropriateness of the relation of a jurisdiction's laws).
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allocation of a risk that under governing law could have been allocated by a
term in the contract specifically allocating the risk. 4
With this background, counsel seeking to protect the client from any unfortunate results of a choice of law clause, endeavor to show, often unsuccessfully,
that the result is contrary to strong policy of the forum state. 5
In Burroughs Corp. v. Suntogs of Miami, Inc.,6 the parties selected Michigan
law and agreed to a two-year limitation period. A Florida statute, amended
after Florida's adoption of the U.C.C., provided that a contractual provision
shortening the period provided in the applicable statute of limitations was
"void." 7 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court reversed the lower court ruling that
Florida public policy voided the clause. The court based its decision upon the
policy found in U.C.C. section 1-105, an analogy to Florida's usury law, 8 that
the statute before it was "riddled with exceptions," 9 and concluded "third, we do
not consider the protections offered by a statute of limitations fundamental to a
legal system." 10
4. Intamin, Inc. v. Figley-Wright Contractors, Inc., 595 F. Supp. 1350, 40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 766 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (contract for construction of a roller-coaster, which under Illinois'
"dominant aspect" test would be a service contract. The contract provided for construction and
enforcement "in accordance with the law of the State of Illinois and the Uniform Commercial Code
of that State" except as expressly contradicted by a term of the contract).
5. Mostek Corp. v. Chemetron Corp., 642 S.W.2d 20, 40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 840
(Tex. Ct. App. 1982) (goods delivered in Texas. Illinois law applied as parties had not contracted
"at will, fraudulently or capriciously" to avoid law of Texas. Warranty disclaimers and disclaimers
of negligence not contrary to Texas law. Illinois precluded disclaimers of strict liability in tort);
Kathenes v. Quick Chek Food Stores, 596 F. Supp. 713, 39 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1326
(D.N.J. 1984) (personal injury claim of consumer having been settled, the indemnity action between
bottler and supplier was governed by contractual choice of Ohio law, and no strong public policy of
New Jersey required application of New Jersey's product liability law to the commercial transaction between merchants. Contractual limitation of liability term in confirming invoice, under
U.C.C. § 2-207, became a part of contract as a nonmaterial additional term); Bancorp Leasing &
Fin. Corp. v. Burhoop, 39 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1426 (9th Cir. 1984; unpublished and not
citable in 9th Circuit) (parties to secured transaction selection of Colorado's rebuttable presumption
of value in nonconforming sale of collateral not contrary to California's public policy because
California's rule is absolute bar of deficiency. Here presumption was rebutted).
6. 472 So. 2d 1166, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 498 (Fla. 198t.
7. Fla. Stat. Ann.§ 95.03 (West 1975) reads, "Any provision in a co tract fixing the period of
time within which an action arising out of a contract may be begun at a ti e less than that provided
by the applicable statute of limitations is void."
8. Citing Continental Mortgage Investors v. Sailboat Key, Inc., 395, So. 2d 507 (Fla. 1981)
(choice of law clause permits recovery of interest at ~ rate higher than the Florida cap but
permissible in the other state). Usury law of Florida was "fraught with exceptions."
9. 472 So. 2d at 1168, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 501.
10. Id. The other two stated grounds were that the statute had not been applied to maritime
cases under "an earlier, even more stringent version" (citing Arrow Beffe Corp. v. South Atl. &
Caribbean Lines, Inc., 280 So. 2d 43 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973) and two earlier district court of
appeals cases). The earlier version expressly declared shortening clauses "contrary to the public
policy of the state." Id. at 1168 note, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 501 note. Also cited were
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Enright, 258 So. 2d 472 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972) and one other
case, in which the only connection with Florida was that plaintiff resided in Florida when suit was
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An attempt, effective in lower court, to avoid a choice of law provision on the
ground that it had not been brought to the attention of the buyer was reversed
by the Fifth Circuit as "clearly erroneous" on the evidence, as the paper was
"transparent" showing clearly that there were terms on the reverse. 11

HYBRID SALES AND SERVICE CASES
The year was uneventful for the Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Scope of the Code.
There were actually only three interesting cases on what constitutes a transaction in goods.
The dreary litany of repair, construction, and purchase of business contracts
not being subject to the U.C.C. continued, 12 as did the "true lease" versus the
started. The court noted that such contractual provisions had been upheld in 1918 and that a statute
of limitations was "merely ... an affirmative defense" and did not invalidate the contract.
11. Lafayette Stabilizer Repair, Inc. v. Machinery Wholesalers Corp. 750 F.2d 1290, 40
U.C.C .. Rep. Serv. 122 (5th Cir. 1985) (in addition to the transparency of the paper, the signer was
"a lawyer with approximately twenty-seven years of experience" and thus could be reasonably
expected to examine the back of the paper. The result reached by the trial court was a judgment for
the return of the purchase price "and certain associated expenses such as interest paid on the loan to
finance the purchase price and the cost of repairs" for a total judgment of $86,436.55. Defendant's
claim that a term limiting its liability for the cost of repairs to $6,900 was a U.C.C. § 2-718
liquidated damage clause was dismissed as well as its claims of lack of prompt notice of breach of
warranty and lack of proper inspection).
12. In general, U.C.C. not applicable: Gee v. Chattahoochee Tractor Sales, Inc., 172 Ga. App.
351, 323 S.E.2d 176, 40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 30 (1984) (installation of engine block);
Clancy v. Oak Park Village Athletic Center, 364 N.W.2d 312, 40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan)
832 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985) (puddle on racquetball court, slipped and fell); DeValerio v. Vic Tanny
Int'l, 363 N.W.2d 447, 40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 836 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985) (use of
equipment at a spa). U.C.C. applicable: Yorke v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 130 Ill. App. 3d 220, 474
N.E.2d 20 (1985) (vinyl pellets and technical assistance, goods aspect predominates); but cf
Acchione & Canuso v. Reed Mining Tools, Inc., 39 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1585 (E.D. Pa.
1984) (change of function of machine but sale of goods because contract was for parts with free
design services. Court said if contract had been to change the soft tunnel boring machine into a rock
cutter, contract would have been for services). The last case seems to overemphasize form. Sale of
business as an entity-U.C.C. not applicable: Beauliau of Am. Inc. v. Coronet Indus., Inc., 327
S.E.2d 508, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 20 (Ga. App. 1985) (sale of industrial plant, general
statute of frauds applicable); D.G. Porter, Inc. v. Fridley, 373 N.W.2d 917, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 1823 (N.D. 1985) (sale of bar and grill, goodwill, liquor license, assignment of lease,
etc. predominate); accord Flo-Mor, Inc. v. Birmingham, 176 Ga. App. 375, 336 S.E.2d 264, 42
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 228 (1985); Dravo Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., 602 F.2d 1136,
40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 362 (W.D. Pa. 1985) (main assets were drawings and tracings
and five-year noncompetition agreement). Not every asset in a sale of a business needs to be goods;
rather, goods must predominate. De Filippo v. Ford Motor Co., 516 F.2d 1313 (3d Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 912 (1975). Construction contracts: Wellmore Coal Co. v. Powell Constr. Co., 600
F. Supp 1042, 40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 362 (W.D. Va. 1984) (coal preparation plant;
because both parties treated transactions as a sale, U.C.C. warranties applied); Smith v. Urethane
Installations, Inc., 492 A.2d 1266, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 733 (Me. 1985) (in contract to
insulate a home, U.C.C. statute of limitations not applicable); Union Exploration Co. v. Dowell
Div. Dow Chem. Co., 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 759 (D. Kan. 1985) (primary cement
work on oil wells; U.C.C. principles regarding exculpatory provisions applied); Peerless Pump v.
Blythe-Vanguard Constr. Corp., 40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 494 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (a

1366 The Business Lawyer; Vol. 41, August 1986
disguised sale distinction in the application of a variety of sections of the
U.C.C. 13 A distinction was also made between the true finance lease and other
leases, 14 anticipating the distinction to be made upon the adoption, anywhere, of
the Uniform Personal Property Leasing Act approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. 15 There were also cases arguing
whether the U.C.C. applied to distributorship agreements. 16
manufacture of effiuent pumps to buyer's specifications was still a sale of goods, not a service
contract. Statute of limitations not tolled). Miscellaneous: Weiss v. Karch, 466 N.E.2d 155, 477
N.Y.S.2d 615, 39 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 901 (1984) (damage rules of article 2 apply to sale
of securities transferring cooperative apartment); Pierce v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 166 Cal. App. 3d
85, 212 Cal Rptr. 283, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 20 (1985) (electricity in stream of
commerce a "product" for strict liability issue; dismissal reversed. Warranty issue not in pleadings
nor in discovery. Hence, dismissal of warranty count affirmed); Piney Woods Country Life School
v. Shell Oil Co., 726 F.2d 225, 40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1220 (5th Cir. 1984) (natural gas; U.C.C.
used to determine time of sale for royalty purposes); Amoco Prod. Co. v. Western Slope Gas Co.,
754 F.2d 303, 40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 370 (10th Cir. 1985) (natural gas; U.C.C.
applies).
13. As to applicability of the U.C.C. in some lease transactions, see Beneficial Commercial Corp.
v. Cottrell, 688 P.2d 1254, 39 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1308 (Mont. 1984) (warranty
disclaimers and unconscionability in a lease with nominal option to purchase); Irving Leasing Corp.
v. M & H Tire Co., 16 Ohio App. 3d 191, 475 N .E.2d 127, 40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 381
(1984) (applying U.C.C. § 2-302); Hannaford Bros. Co. v. State Tax Assessor, 487 A.2d 251, 40
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 374 (Me. 1985) (lease constituted a sale for use tax purposes);
Baldwin v. National Safe Depository Corp., 697 P.2d 587, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 471
(1985) (U.C.C. applied to "operating lease"); Baker v. Promark Prods. W., Inc., 692 S.W.2d 844,
41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 725 (Tenn. 1985) (breach of warranty); Henderson v. BensonHartman Motors, Inc., 33 Pa. D. & C. 3d 6, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 782 (Pa. Ct.
Common Pleas 1983) (warranty beneficiaries under U.C.C. in lease transaction); Chemical Bank v.
Rinden Professional Ass'n, 498 A.2d 706, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1035 (N.H. 1985)
(lease-purchase agreement applying U.C.C. art. 2 as to modifications and effect of assignment to
bank).
14. Baldwin v. National Safe Depository Corp., 697 P.2d at 589 n.2, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) at 473 n.2. Cf Bancohio Nat'! Bank v. Freeland, 13 Ohio App. 3d 245, 468 N.E.2d
941, 39 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 748 (1984) (15-year statute of limitations governs lender's
sale of collateral and claim for deficiency, not U .C.C. § 2-706(3) as to notice and § 2-725 as to
limitations. What if bank had been assignee of sales contract with a seller's reservation of title?
15. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws adopted the Uniform
Personal Property Leasing Act at its summer 1985 meeting using occasionally modified U.C.C. art.
2 sections. At this writing, it has not been adopted by any state. In Dec. 1985, the U.C.C.
Permanent Editorial Board recommended the addition of the Act, with minor changes, to the
U.C.C. as a new art. 2A. Therefore, under future consideration is whether the Act should be
formally integrated into the U.C.C. by action of the ALI and the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws at appropriate meetings of those bodies.
16. See Lorenz Supply Co. v. American Standard Inc., 419 Mich. 610, 358 N.W.2d 845, 39
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1169 (1984) (distributorship agreement not mentioning exclusive dealing or
supplying requirements not a transaction in goods for U.C.C. § 2-201 purposes). But see Seaman's
Direct Buying Serv., Inc. v. Standard Oil of Cal., 36 Cal. 3d 752, 206 Cal. Rptr. 354, 686 P.2d
1158 ( 1984) (implying that a "dealership arrangement" clearly implied an arrangement to supply
the dealer's requirements, thus satisfying the general statute of frauds as to contracts not to be
performed within a year as well as the U.C.C.'s provision). See also Rustproofing Center, Inc. v.
Gulf Oil Corp., 755 F.2d 1231, 40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 802 (6th Cir. 1985) (open price
to be fixed by Gulf, not a failure to act in good faith if price is higher than retail prices charged by
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RRX Industries, Inc. v. Lab-Con, Inc. 11 raised again for the Ninth Circuit
the question of the classification of computer software. Admittedly the decision
should be case by case, 18 but, just as an architect's or engineer's contract is for
services and not for a sale of the completed drawings, 19 so too a computer
software contract, when a proper analysis of the design features of a program is
really the predominant factor, should be a contract for services. 20 On the other
hand, prepackaged software programs, like cassettes and phonograph records,
should be classified as "goods," 21 although a contract for a musician to play a
musical number to be taped for just one listener would not be.
Categorizing computer software as "goods" may be influenced by the paucity
of precedent if a service categorization, emphasizing the brain-work requirement for custom-designed software, were to have been adopted. Perhaps the
matter will be clarified by the new Scope Subcommittee, along with the
problems arising in many recognizable service contracts. 22
dealer's competitors); Conoco Inc. v. Inman Oil Co., 774 F.2d 895, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 1602 (8th Cir. 1985) (violation of good faith under U.C.C. § 1-203 for supplier to bid
against the distributor for supply contract with jobber's oldest and best customer); Loos & Dilworth
v. Quaker State Oil Ref. Corp., 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 46 (Pa. Super. 1985) (U.C.C.
principles applied by analogy; termination of franchise agreement must be with honesty in fact
(U.C.C. § 1-201(19)), and franchisor must have acted in a commercially reasonable manner. Hence
franchisee offering no evidence of what is commercially reasonable can still recover upon proof of a
lack of honesty in fact. New trial ordered by trial judge affirmed, charge should have used an "or"
instead of an "and" between "good faith" and "acting in a commercially reasonable manner").
17. 772 F.2d 543, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1561 (9th Cir. 1985).
18. The court stated that "the sales aspect of the transaction predominates," and that "employee
training, repair services, and upgrading were incidental." 772 F.2d at 546, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at
1564. For the need for case-by-case analysis, the court cited Note, Computer Programs as Goods
under the U.C.C., 77 Mich. L. Rev. 1149 (1979). The court does not discuss the service aspect of
designing the software.
19. Software not packaged for repeated sales to many different computer users seems more
analogous to design drawings that are not considered goods. See Department of Transp. v.
Bethlehem Steel Corp., 28 Pa. Commw. 439, 368 A.2d 888, 21 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 36
(1977) (bridge design plans not goods). Dravo Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., 602 F. Supp. 1136,
40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 362 (W.D. Pa. 1985), in which the court said of a sale of
engineering drawings, "The significance of these items in this transaction is not their physical
properties, but the ideas contained therein." 602 F. Supp. at 1140, 40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 369.
The significance of specially designed software is not its physical properties but the commands it
enables the operator to give to the hardware.
20. While a contract to publish books for general sale may be a contract for goods, a contract to
write a book and deliver one copy or all copies to one person would be a contract for services. In
Printing Center of Texas, Inc. v. Supermind Publishing Co., 669 S.W.2d 779, 39 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 127-30 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984) the court said that to treat a contract to print and deliver
5,000 books as a transaction in goods was a "doubtful assumption," but the issue was not properly
raised.
21. Thus, prepackaged programs to be inserted in any number of personal computers should be
classified as "goods," just as are cassettes for producing music on any given number of players or
phonograph records.
22. One member of this Subcommittee has long complained of the difficulty of finding precedent
applicable to commercial service contracts. The new Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Scope, chaired by
Professor Boss, met with this Subcommittee for the first time at the Section's 1985 spring meeting.
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Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Certainteed Corp. 23 was the second interesting case.
Safeway contracted for the building of a warehouse. The roofing contractor used
products produced by Certainteed. The court treated the case as a sale of goods
for warranty purposes, distinguishing it from an earlier construction of a
building case 24 in which it was ruled that the U.C.C. was not applicable. While
Safeway was treated as having express warranty rights against Certainteed,25
the statement that the roof was "bondable up to twenty years" did not make the
warranty one extending to future performance (except in the view of a dissenting judge). 26
Finally, a sale of the breeding rights to a stallion by a natural method was, in
Kwik-Lok Corp. v. Pulse, 21 ruled not a sale of goods when live breeding was
contemplated, since the predominant subject of the contract was not readily
removeable from the donor at the time of identification to the contract. 28

Other Statutes Affecting Articles 2 and 7
Other statutes are beginning to affect sales law under the U.C.C. The
Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act2923. 687 S.W.2d 22, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 46 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985).
24. Id. at 24 n.1, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 47 n.1. Vaughn Bldg. Corp. v. Austin Co., 620
S.W.2d 678 (Tex Ct. App. 1981), affd 643 S.W.2d 113 (Tex. 1983). Accord Mennonite Deaconess
Home & Hosp. v. Gates Eng'g Co., 363 N.W.2d 155, 40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 396 (Neb.
1985) (a one-ply, System I roof manufactured and designed by defendant and installed by others
under defendant's supervision). In both the claim was for breach of warranty. Contra Elizabeth
Gamble Deaconess Home Ass'n v. Turner Constr. Co., 14 Ohio App. 3d 281, 470 N.E.2d 950, 39
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1198 (1984) (U.C.C. does not apply to materials incorporated into a
structure). Apparently alternative A of U.C.C. § 2-318 precluded suit as a third-party beneficiary of
the installer's contract with the supplier. But see infra text accompanying note 94.
25. This was based on Certainteed's advertising and description of its product as "bondable up
to twenty years," which had been examined by the plantiff before making the contract. Suit was
instituted nine years after installation and was ruled to be barred by U.C.C. § 2-725. 687 S.W.2d at
24, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 46, 47.
26. The majority felt that the language quoted was only a warranty or representation that a
bond could be purchased and Safeway had introduced no evidence on the point. Id. at 25, 41 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 48. Judge Guillot, dissenting, felt that the language meant that a bond
could be purchased at any time for a minimum of one year and up to a maximum of 20 years after
completion depending on when the bond was purchased. Hence the warranty "explicitly" extended
to future performance. Id. at 27, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 50. Extending the warranty,
however, would eliminate the need to pay any premium for the roofing bond.
27. 41 Wash. App. 142, 702 P.2d 1226 (1985).
28. Id. at _ _ _ , 702 P.2d at 1228 n.1. Where the sperm is packaged and sold for artificial
insemination. Another aspect of breeding rights, the saleable right of each of 36 syndicate members
to nominate a mare to breed each season, was involved in Trimble v. North Ridge Farms, Inc., 41
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1458 (Ky. 1985). The issue was whether the secured party after
default could exercise the nominating right for the 1982 season that had been sold as permitted by
the syndicate agreement assigned as collateral. The trial court had ruled in favor of the assignee of
the secured party who then exercised the rights. By the time the case reached the Supreme Court of
Kentucky, which affirmed a reversal of the trial court by the Kentucky Court of Appeals, the case
could only be left open for a determination of damages, an issue not ripe for the appellate court.
29. 15 u.s.c. §§ 2301-2312 (1982).
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figured in three cases. In a case involving a defective car with counts under the
U.C.C. and under Magnuson-Moss, damages for emotional distress were denied.30 In another case, a de(ller who had agreed in writing to perform warranty
work for DeLorean cars, and had furnished a lessee with the manufacturer's
warranty, had thereby issued a written warranty under Magnuson-Moss and
could not disclaim the warranty of merchantability. 31 Recovery of damages for
loss of use of the car when the dealer refused to make repairs because DeLorean
could not pay, and for costs of litigation and attorney's fees, was allowed. The
third case reached a similar warranty result in a lease closely resembling an
installment sale. 32
A North Carolina statute relating to suits for damages resulting from the use
of fertilizer, which prescribed the evidence required, caused a dismissal of a
grower's suit. 33
Federal and state "seed laws" have been held not to preempt the warranty
and unconscionability provisions of the U.C.C. 34
Colorado's livestock bill of sale laws did not affect the U.C.C.-mandated
result in three cases. 35 The results are similar to many interpretations of the
effect of motor vehicle certificate of title laws. 36
In one case, a federal court, applying New York law, refused to dismiss a
claim that a breach of warranty, as alleged, was a claim of deceptive practices

30. Wise v. General Motors Corp., 588 F. Supp. 1207, 39 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 900
(W.D. Va. 1984). Hence, attorney's fees allowed under Magnuson-Moss to successful plaintiffs
were not recoverable.
31. Freeman v. Hubco Leasing, Inc., 253 Ga. 698, 324 S.E.2d 462, 40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 408 (1985). Because Hubco Leasing Inc. was an alter ego of the dealer plaintiff, it was
allowed to revoke acceptance of the lease.
32. Henderson v. Benson-Hartman Motors, Inc., 33 Pa. D. & C. 3d 6, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 782 (1983).
33. L. Harvey and Son Co. v. Jarman, 76 N.C. App. 191, 333 S.E.2d 47, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 107 (1985).
34. Hanson v. Funk Seeds Int'!, 373 N.W.2d 30, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1244 (S.D.
1985); Martin v. Joseph Harris Co., Inc., 767 F.2d 296, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 315
(6th Cir. 1985) (construing the Federal Seed Act, 7 U.S.C. § 1551-1611 (1982), Mich. Comp.
Laws Ann.§§ 286.701-286.716 (West 1979) and S.D. Codified Laws Ann.§§ 3~-12-1to38-12-52
(1969 and 1984 Supp.), which do not provide for a civil remedy).
r
35. Cugnini v. Reynolds Cattle Co., 687 P.2d 962, 39 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (pallaghan) 112,
(Colo. 1984) (compliance not necessary for passage of title); Moffat County State B4nk v. Prodµcers
Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 598 F. Supp. 1562, 40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 314 (p. Colo. 1984),
(description in art. 9 financing statement need not comply with livestock bill of sale law); Colorado
State Bank of Walsh v. Hoffner, 701 P.2d 151, 40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1490 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1985) (failure of seller and reselling buyer to comply does not affect passage of title).
36. See, e.g., Taylor & Martin, Inc. v. Hiland Dairy, Inc., 676 S.W.2d 859, 39 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. (Callaghan) 1672 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984) (failure to comply with Texas certificate of title to
motor vehicle law does not preclude passage of title); Safeco Ins. Co. v. Lapp., 695 P.2d 1310, 40
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 887 (Mont. 1985). Inmi-Etti v. Aluisi, 492 A.2d 917, 40 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1612 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985) (erroneous issue of certificate of title
confers no title).
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under New York's "little FTC Act," 37 relying on Massachusetts and Washington cases. 38
A Virginia pre-U.C.C. law, not specifically repealed by the U.C.C., requiring a particular type size in contracts, was ruled implicitly repealed by the
requirement of U.C.C. section 2-316 that disclaimers be conspicuous. 39 On the
other hand, an Arkansas special statute regarding the sale or transfer of
judgment liens prevailed over an l.R.S. lien despite the failure of the transferee
to file under the u.c.c.•0
A storer of grain in Arkansas taking an advance payment had not passed title
to the warehouseman and so was still protected by the surety bond required of
the warehouse by the Arkansas public grain warehouse law.4 1
Perhaps our most interesting case in this area is Baker u. Promark Products
West, lnc.,4 2 in which the Tennessee Supreme Court used its Product Liability
Act's expanded definition of "seller" 43 to permit recovery for breach of the
implied warranty of merchantability against a lessor who had leased a stump
grinder for half a day.•• The plaintiff was a user, not the lessee.4 5 The lower
courts granted summary judgment to the lessor and the distributor. The high
court reversed as to the lessor, using cases applying the U.C.C. warranties to
leases without distinguishing those doing so on a finding of equivalence to sale.
A division of authority was, however, recognized. 46 The court affirmed the
dismissal of the claim against the distributor for the reason that the distributor
37. Associates Capital Servs. Corp. of N.J. v. Fairway Private Cars, Inc., 590 F. Supp. 10, 39
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 818 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
38. Id. (citing Levings v. Forbes & Wallace, Inc., 8 Mass. App. 498, 396 N.E.2d 149 (1979);
Linthicum v. Archambault, 379 Mass. 381, 398 N.E.2d 482 (1979); Haner v. Quincy Farm
Chems., Inc., 29 Wash. App. 93, 98-103, 627 P.2d 571, 575-77 (1981)). Many of the little FTC
Acts provide for the recovery of attorney fees, and some for treble damages.
39. Armco Inc. v. New Horizon Dev. Co. of Va., Inc., 331 S.E.2d 456, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 367 (Va. 1985).
40. Brown & Root, Inc. v. Hempstead County Sand & Gravel, Inc., 767 F.2d 464, 41 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1002 (8th Cir. 1985).
41. Tucker v. Durham, 284 Ark. 264, 686 S.W.2d 402 (1985).
42. 692 S.W.2d 844, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 725 (Tenn. 1985).
43. The Tennessee Products Liability Act, Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 29-28-101 to -108 (1980),
provided that "Seller" shall also include a lessor or bailor engaged in the business of leasing or
bailment of a product.
44. The plaintiff's claim in tort was dismissed under Tenn. Code Ann.§ 29-28-106(b) (1985
Supp.), which prohibits suits on a strict liability in tort basis unless either the seller is the
manufacturer or the manufacturer has been declared insolvent or is not subject to process. The
manufacturer had been nonsuited and was not a party to the appeal.
45. 692 S.W.2d at 845, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 727. Previously, Commercial Truck and
Trailer Sales, Inc. v. McCampbell, 580 S.W.2d 765, 26 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 340 (Tenn.
1979) held that Tenn. Code Ann.§ 29-34-104, abolishing privily in all actions "for personal injury
or property damage brought on account of negligence, strict liability or breach of warranty," had
implicity amended Tennessee's U.C.C. § 2-318 to broaden the class of warranty beneficiaries.
46. 692 S.W.2d at 848-49, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 731-32. The court cited cases from Alaska,
Alabama, California Appeals, Florida law in a federal court, Georgia Appeals, Idaho, Illinois
Appeals, and a lower court case in New York that had been reversed on other grounds by the
Appellate Division. To the contra were cases from Delaware, Maryland, Montana, and Virginia,
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merely transmitted orders for the equipment involved to the manufacturer,
which shipped directly to the lessor.47
It seems that other statutes must be considered more often than we think.

ARTICLE 2-SALES
STATUTE OF FRAUDS
Courts continue to struggle with the myriad forms of commercial arrangements that defy easy categorization and seem not to have been contemplated
when many provisions of article 2 were originally drafted. Consider, for
example, distributorship agreements and the U.C.C.'s statute of frauds. If
within the category "transactions in goods" they would be covered by article 2, 48
that alone is not enough to trigger U.C.C. section 2-201. They must additionally be "contract(s] for the sale of goods." 49 Finally, assuming that section 2-201
does apply, how can its quantity requirement be satisfied when the future needs
of the distributor will always be uncertain? 50 These problems arose in Lorenz
Supply Co. v. American Standard, Inc. 51
The trial court permitted the plaintiff, Lorenz, to prove, and the jury found
that the parties had agreed that Lorenz was to become a distributor of American
Standard products. The only writing that in any way evidenced this agreement
was in a letter from American Standard to Lorenz that "welcome(d]" Lorenz
"to the numbers of American Standard distributors across the country." 52
Affirming a judgment in favor of Lorenz, the Michigan Supreme Court,
without deciding whether the agreement was within the general scope of article
2, held it was not a contract for the sale of goods within the meaning of section
2-201. The court's reasoning was simple and straightforward: it had to rule the
way it did to preserve the enforceability of distributorship agreements it felt
would be at risk if section 2-201 were to apply. A lengthy concurrence offers a
different route to the same result. Justice Brickley had no difficulty finding that
the agreement was subject to both article 2 and its statute of frauds, but would
solve the quantity dilemma by inferring a quantity term, that is, the distributor's requirements. 53
but at the time none of these contra jurisdictions had a products liability act in force. But see
proposed Uniform Personal Property Leasing Act's treatment of warranties.
47. The arguments used are similar to those used to rule that financing agencies are not subject
to liability for breaches of warranty in the transactions financed. See, e.g., J.P. Marks Int'!, Inc. v.
Corema S.A. Empresa De Comercio E. Exportacao, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 733
(S.D.N.Y. 1985).
48. See V.C.C. § 2-102 ( 1978) ("unless the context otherwise requires, this Article applies to
transactions in goods").
49. u.c.c. § 2-201 (1978).
50. One absolute requirement of§ 2-201 is that the writing specify a quantity. See V.C.C. § 2201, Comment 1 (1978).
51. 419 Mich. 610, 358 N.W.2d 845, 39 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1169 (1984).
52. Id. at 614, 358 N.W.2d at 849, 39 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 1171.
53. Id. at 635, 358 N.W.2d at 855-56, 39 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 1185-86. Most
commercially minded courts have been willing to accept the sufficiency of a writing if it provides for
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The result is correct but, because of their obvious result orientation, both
opinions are less than satisfactory. This is a perfect example of what could
become standard practice if the U.C.C. fails to maintain its adaptability to
current commercial practices.
While the U.C.C. leaves little doubt that a partial payment will satisfy
section 2-201 as to an apportionable part of the goods, 54 it is silent whether a
partial payment on an indivisible contract is sufficient to allow proof of the oral
agreement. The seller's argument that oral proof should not be allowed was
rejected in The Press, Inc. v. Fins & Feathers Publishing Co. 55 Strongly critical
of the statute's potential for permitting escape from otherwise enforceable
bargains, the court refused to broaden its scope by recognizing an indivisible
contract exception to the partial payment exception. 56
Finally, while on the subject of payment, it should be mentioned that courts
continue to adhere to the rule that the buyer's stopping of payment on a check
does not strip it of its payment character. 57

BATTLE OF THE FORMS
Several recurring issues under U.C.C. section 2-207 received attention in
Daitom, Inc. v. Pennwalt Corp. 58 The battle of the forms began when Pennwalt
submitted a proposal, together with preprinted terms and conditions, for the sale
of two rotary vacuum dryers. Among the terms and conditions were a limitation
of liability clause and a clause providing a limitations period of one year from
the date of delivery for any action for breach of warranty. Daitom responded
with its purchase order and its preprinted terms and conditions, which included
a reservation of all warranties and remedies available at law. Moreover, the
purchase order provided that "acceptance by seller" was "expressly limited to
such terms and conditions." 59 When the dryers proved defective, Daitom sued.
The district court entered summary judgment for Pennwalt, finding that the
claim was barred by the one-year limitations period. 60
delivery of a party's requirements or output. See Leary & Frisch, General Provisions, Sales, Bulk
Transfers, and Documents of Title, 40 Bus. Law. 1457 ( 1985 ). Admitting that a requirements term
is specific enough to satisfy the statute, the majority refused to infer such a term because "not all
distributorship agreements are requirements or output contracts." Id. at 612, 358 N.W.2d at 847,
39 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 1171.
54. See U.C.C. § 2-201, Comment 2 (1978) ("if the price has been paid, the seller can be forced
to deliver an apportionable part of the goods").
55. 361N.W.2d171, 40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 33 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
56. Not clear from the court's opinion is what weight, if any, was accorded the fact that there
was no quantity dispute. Id. at 174, 40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 36.
57. Miller v. Wooters, 131 Ill. App. 3d 682, 476 N.E.2d 11, 40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan)
1623 (1985).
58. 741F.2d1569, 39 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1203 (10th Cir. 1984).
59. Id. at 1575-76, 39 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 1212.
60. Id. at 1573, 39 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 1207. Throughout the opinion the Tenth
Circuit makes no effort to hide its sympathy for the buyer, Daitom, who because of circumstances
beyond its control, could not within the one-year period try out the machinery and discover the
defects.
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The Tenth Circuit, applying nonexistent Pennsylvania law, 61 reversed. It
first rejected Daitom's contention that the acceptance of the original proposal
was expressly contingent on Pennwalt's agreeing to the terms and conditions
accompanying the purchase order. Absent was an explicit communication that
Daitom would not proceed unless its terms were accepted by Pennwalt. 62
Having concluded that the exchanged writings formed a contract, the court's
next job was to ascertain its terms. Believing that Daitom's reservation of its
legal rights implicitly reserved the U.C.C.'s four-year period and remedies, 63 the
court applied the "knock-out" rule and held that the· conflicting terms in
Pennwalt's offer and Daitom's acceptance cancelled one another. 64 Consequently, in the absence of evidence of course of performance, course of dealing,
or usage of trade, the U.C.C. will supply the missing terms.
Notice that it is possible for a knocked-out term to become part of the contract
if the created gap is filled by an identical term. In Pennwalt, if the U.C.C.'s gap
fillers are used, the final contract will conform to Daitom's terms and conditions. Should this be the result? The court is correct, however, in its view that
before resorting to the U.C.C., course of performance, course of dealing, and
usage of trade should be consulted for appropriate terms.
Not surprisingly, U.C.C. section 2-207(2)(b) continues to be the subject of
frequent litigation, forcing courts to decide whether additional provisions in the
acceptance or confirmation materially alter the contract. Two recent cases have
indicated that a clause providing for a one-year limitations period for bringing
61. Pennwalt is a Pennsylvania corporation with its principal place of business in Pennsylvania.
Apparently for this reason the parties never disputed the application of Pennsylvania law to the
warranty claims. Unfortunately, no Pennsylvania court had ever decided the exact issues raised by
the case.
62. 741 F.2d at 1577, 39 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 1214. The judicial trend favoring a
narrow construction of the U.C.C. § 2-207(1) (1978) proviso that an acceptance is not an acceptance
if "expressly made conditional on assent to the additional or different terms" shows no signs of
abating (emphasis added). See also Challenge Mach. Co. v. Mattison Machine Works, 138 Mich.
App. 15, 39 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1578 (1984); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Bucyrus-Erie
Co., 125 Wis. 2d 418, 373 N.W.2d 65, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1192 (1985). Additionally, the court thought the phrasing of the purchase order detracted from Daitom's argument of
conditional acceptance. See 741 F.2d 1569, 39 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 1203. It read more
like an offer than an acceptance. This reasoning underscores the observation in last year's survey of
the importance of distinguishing between "offers" and "acceptances." See Leary & Frisch, General
Provisions, Sales, Bulk Transfers, and Documents of Title, 40 Bus. Law. 1467-68 (1985). Perhaps,
if the purchase order had been labeled an offer, the court would have held that its terms were
controlling. See U.C.C. § 2-207(2)(a) (1978).
63. 741 F.2d at 1577-80, 39 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 1215-16, 1218-20. On this point
the dissent differed. Judge Barrett argued that "[t]here was no term in Daitom's purchase order in
conflict with the express one-year limitation." Id. at 1583, 39 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at
1224.
64. Id. at 1579-80, 39 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 1218-19. The "knock-out" rule is premised on the
applicability of U.C.C. § 2-207(2) ( 1978) to additional terms only, not different terms. If the
writings contain different terms, these terms will not become a part of the contract. For other
decisions adopting this approach, see Challenge Mach. Co. v. Mattison Machine Co., 138 Mich.
App. 15, 39 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1578 (1984); St. Paul Structural Steel Co. v. ABI
Contracting, Inc., 364 N.W.2d 83, 40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 789 (N.D. 1985).

1374

The Business Lawyer; Vol. 41, August 1986

suit is not a material alteration, 65 and a third decided that a limitation of
remedies clause is immaterial. 66 On the other hand, a forum selection clause is a
material alteration. 67
In another case, 68 the Seventh Circuit, applying Wisconsin law, ruled that a
disclaimer of implied warranties materially altered the original bargain of the
parties. But as the court points out, this does not necessarily end the matter.
There is always the possibility that the other party agreed to the additional
term, 69 and so it was in this case. The court found persuasive the district court's
finding that the buyer was aware of the terms, assigned the limited warranty to
its customers, and invoked the limited warranty on numerous occasions. Thus,
according to the court, the buyer had "expressly agreed . . . by its course of
conduct." 70

WARRANTIES

GENERAL
The usual mass of litigation on warranty issues, mostly routine and of minor
significance, was found in the cases reported. A few had some interest.
Uncooked pork hit the books again 71 with apparently no consideration given
to whether technological advances had occurred after the earlier precedent that
was cited. 72 Two cases held that guns with which one child killed another were
"merchantable" as the ordinary purpose of a handgun is to fire a bullet, and
each gun did. 73 The absence of a safety catch did not result in a breach of that
warranty. In New Hampshire, the exploding bottle, this time containing champagne for sale in a state liquor store, raised an issue of sovereign immunity. 74 If
liability was in tort, the state had waived its immunity. The ruling was that the
65. Acchione & Camesa, Inc. v. Reed Mining Tools, Inc., 39 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan)
1585 (E.D. Pa. 1984 ); Therma-Coustics Mfg. Co. v. Borden Inc., 213 Cal. Rptr. 611, 40 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1640 (1985).
66. Kathenes v. Quick Chek Food Stores, 596 F. Supp. 713, 39 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan)
1326 (D.N.J. 1984).
67. Occidental Chem. Corp. v. H & W Indus., Inc., 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 756
(E.D. Pa. 1985).
68. Twin Disc, Inc. v. Big Bud Tractor, Inc., 772 F.2d 1329, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan)
1627 (7th Cir. 1985 ).
69. See U.C.C. § 2-207, Comment 3 ( 1978).
70. 772 F.2d at 1335, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 1635 (emphasis added).
71. Popour v. Holiday Food Center, Inc., 364 N.W.2d 764, 40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan)
1671 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985).
72. Cf Clouser v. Shamokin Packing Co., 240 Pa. Super. 268, 361 A.2d 836 (1976), in which a
motion to dismiss the complaint was denied. An allegation of negligence entitles plaintiff to prove
that since the date of prior precedent a viable method of detecting trichinosis has been developed.
73. Rhodes v. R.G. Industries, Inc., 173 Ga. App. 51, 325 S.E.2d 465, 40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 1668 (1984); Love v. Zales Corp., 689 S.W.2d 282, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan)
69 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985).
74. Sheehan v. New Hampshire Liquor Comm'n, 493 A.2d 494, 40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 1665 (N.H. 1985).
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retailer's liability lay in contract, and for such actions immunity had not been
waived.
The Fourth Circuit, in a nonwarranty case, struggled with a statute changing
privity rules. 75 The panel concluded that to avoid retroactivity in application,
the change was effective only for sales occurring after the effective date. Hence,
if the accident and injury occurred after the effect, but the sale was made before,
the statute did not apply. The result is a logical application of contract
principles, treating warranty as a contract term. 76
The advantage of drafting to meet two possible characterizations of the
transaction is shown in three cases involving leased chattels. 77 In two of these,
lessor warranties were disclaimed as if the provisions of article 2 applied. 78 In
the third the suit was against the seller to the lessor. Curiously, the purchase
agreement was signed by the ultimate lessee, but was conditioned upon obtaining from AgriStor Leasing acceptable financing or a lease agreement. The
disclaimers were held to be not conspicuous and hence unenforceable. 79
The implied warranty of merchantability requires that the seller be a
merchant. 80 A Washington State court ruled that one who sold for the first time
75. Farish v. Courion Indus., Inc., 754 F.2d 1111, 40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 857 (4th
Cir. 1985). U.C.C. § 2-318 (Alt. C.) (1978) was enacted in 1965. It was construed as continuing a
statute enacted in 1962. But the goods were manufactured prior to the effective date of the 1962
statute, while the accidents occurred in 1979 and 1981. No statute of limitations point was raised.
The decision was an en bane rehearing of two panel decisions. Nine judges sat. Four joined with
Circuit Judge Sprouse's majority opinion. One judge concurred in a separate opinion and four
judges dissented. The division was on what the Supreme Court of Virginia "would probably hold"
on the issue, 754 F.2d at 1127, 40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 870.
76. The case has significance if a change in U.C.C. § 2-318 (1978) from alternative A to
alternative C is contemplated in any jurisdiction. Taking a similar contact term approach, the New
York Court of Appeals in Heller v. U.S. Suzuki Motor Corp., 40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan)
917 ( 1985) ruled that warranty suits against a remote manufacturer not filed within four years of
sale to distributors, were time-barred without regard to the date of the sale to the purchaser
claiming breach of warranty. At least one member of the Subcommittee believes that the key in each
case should be the date the ultimate buyer or user first had contact with the product influenced by
the manufacturer's advertising. In tort cases the privily rules should be considered procedural and
the policy in favor of protecting against injury should be considered far stronger than privity rules.
77. AgriStor Credit Corp. v. Schmidlin, 601 F. Supp. 1307, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan)
1653 (D. Ore. 1985); AgriStor Leasing v. Hansen, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1660 (D.
Minn. 1985); AgriStor Leasing v. Kjergaard, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1667 (D. Minn.
1985). The last two cases also held that a "finance lessor" was not a "merchant" for U.C.C. § 2-314
purposes.
78. See 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 1660; 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 1667.
79. AgriStor Leasing v. Guggisberg, 617 F. Supp. 902, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1671
(D. Minn. 1985). In the notice on the front about conditions of sale on the reverse only the word
"NOTICE" was in all capitals and the text did not indicate that disclaimers of warranties were
included. The disclaimers were in bold type on the reverse with a place where buyer would initial
an acceptance. The buyer had not initialed. At the end of the text on the reverse side the sales person
had signed.
80. U.C.C. § 2-314(1) (1978). U.C.C. § 2-104(1) (1978) defines a "merchant" as one "who
deals in goods of the kind" involved or holds himself out as having the knowledge or skill of those
who do, or who employs an intermediary having such knowledge or skill. For some recent cases
holding that a "finance lessor" is not a "merchant" for warranty purposes, see supra note 76.
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had not achieved the status of a merchant in that sale. 81 On the other side of the
continent, a Massachusetts court gave merchant status to a public transportation
authority selling its used railcars. 82

DISCLAIMERS AND LIMITED REMEDIES
Provisions limiting a buyer's remedy to a return of the purchase price raise
questions. Black letter law apparently provides that disclaimers of warranties
are effective if made as provided in U.C.C. section 2-316. 83 U.C.C. section 2718 provides for liquidated damages. 84 U.C.C. section 2-719(3) makes a limitation or exclusion of consequential damages subject to attack for unconscionability.85 When seeds do not live up to the sales warranties, what damages are "the
loss resulting in ordinary course of events from the seller's breach" under
U.C.C. section 2-714(1), 86 and what are consequential damages? In Harrison v.
Funk Seeds lnternational, 81 the South Dakota Supreme Court did not address
this question specifically in holding unconscionable a disclaimer of warranties in
accordance with U.C.C. section 2-316 and a limitation of remedy to a recovery
by a farmer of the price paid for seeds. If the damages suffered when the corn
grown from the seeds did not produce good ears of corn and did not make good
silage were thought of as consequential, an application of the doctrine of
unconscionability was invited. 88 If the damages, cost of fertilizer, and loss of crop
81. Fred J. Moore, Inc. v. Schinmann, 700 P.2d 754, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 741
(Wash. Ct. App. 1985).
82. Ferragamo v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 304
(Mass. 1985 ).
83. U.C.C. § 2-316(2), (3) ( 1978) requires either that the disclaimer be "conspicuous" and
mention "merchantability" or be in words clearly indicating no warranty at all.
84. U.C.C. § 2-718 (1978) requires that the amount be "reasonable in the light of the
anticipated or actual harm caused by the breach" but only an "unreasonably large" amount is void
as a penalty. A term limiting warranty recovery to a return of the purchase price will often be
unreasonably small. As such it can only be attacked as not reasonable in the light of the harm caused
by the breach. But see supra note 83.
85. U.C.C. § 2-719(1)(a) (1978) provides that the agreement may limit "the buyer's remedies to
... repayment of the price." Subsection (1 )(b) would permit this limit to be "expressly agreed to be
exclusive" and hence a sole remedy. No controls for rendering such a clause unenforceable are
specifically provided. Subsection (3) does subject exclusions of consequential damages to the test of
unconscionability, but no such test (unless it can be found from§ 2-302 on general unconscionability) applies to damages under U.C.C. § 2-714 (1978). Usually in statutory interpretation the
particular (here U.C.C. § 2-719) controls the general (here U.C.C. § 2-302, in which unconscionability is concerned). Comment 1 to U.C.C. § 2-719 (1978) indicates that the U.C.C. requires "at
least a fair quantum of remedy." But is this legislating by Comment?
86. u.c.c. § 2-714(1) (1978).
87. 373 N.W.2d 30, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1244 (S.D. 1985).
88. U.C.C. § 2-719(3) (1978). Indeed the court strongly relied on Durham v. Ciba-Geigy Corp.,
315 N.W.2d 696, 33 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 588 (S.D. 1982) a pesticide case in which there
was a specific exclusion of consequential damages. That court held that the provisions of S.D.
Codified Laws Ann.§ 38-21-46 (1976) requiring a filing with the state's Secretary of Agriculture
within a prescribed time limit did not preempt the U.C.C. in actions for breach of contract. It
nonetheless stated that the public policy of South Dakota as set forth in the Insecticide, Fungicide
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value were regarded as damages occurring in ordinary course because a good
crop would have sold for enough to cover these items, then the court was
obviously equating the reference to "a fair quantum of remedy" in Comment 1
to U.C.C. section 2-719 89 to the doctrine of unconscionability. The concept of an
unreasonably small quantum of liquidated damages was not even mentioned. 90
If the court was ruling that a disclaimer of the implied warranty of
merchantability could be unconscionable despite compliance with U.C.C. section 2-316, it certainly did not say so. 91 The case appears to rest on the disparity
in bargaining power between the farmer purchaser and the seed merchant. 92 A
dissent by two judges indicates that when the seller sells a product of nature
such as seeds as distinguished from a product fabricated by the seller, a
plaintiff's burden to establish a defect should not be supplied by inference from
a poor crop in certain areas of the farmer's land. 93
The case emphasizes the failure of article 2 of the U.C.C. to provide
guidelines on the difficult question of when damages are ordinary and when
they are consequential. 94 If, however, the requirement of a fair quantum of
remedy is equated to a conscionable limitation of remedy, perhaps one of the
greatest needs for a clear distinction vanishes. 95
The division of authority on whether the failure of the essential purpose of a
limited remedy for breach of warranty also destroys a provision excluding
recovery for consequential damages continues as additional jurisdictions take
sides on the issue. 96
and Rodenticide Act of 1947, S.D. Codified Laws Ann.§§ 38-20A-1 to -53 was to protect farmers
"from the consequences of the sale, delivery, and use of falsely labeled pesticides." This aided the
court in finding that the exclusion of consequential damages was unconscionable. The court in
Hanson did not state whether the damages were U.C.C. § 2-714(1) damages or U.C.C. § 2-715
damages, and did not refer to the South Dakota or Federal Seed Laws for a declaration of policy.
See cases cited supra note 34.
89. Comment 1 also states that "it is of the very essence of a sales contract that at least minimum
adequate remedies be available." Apparently the subsequent reference in the same comment is to
"at least a fair quantum of remedy." The Comment invites the courts to strike clauses that purport
to limit "the remedial provisions of this Article in an unconscionable manner." It is not specifically
stated whether less than a fair quantum or below minimum adequate is per se unconscionable.
90. Perhaps counsel did not equate the dollar figure of the price with the liquidated damages
concept.
91. The opinion relies on Durham, 315 N.W.2d at 696, 33 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at
588. The terms ofU.C.C. § 2-316 (1978) are not discussed.
92. 373 N.W.2d at 35, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 1251.
93. See dissent of Justices Miller and Wollman, 373 N.W.2d at 37, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) at 1252.
94. U.C.C. § 2-714 (1978) refers to loss resulting in ordinary course from the breach. U.C.C.
§ 2-715 (1978) purports to define incidental and consequential damages, but it is not clear when
damages "resulting from general ... needs of which the seller at time of contracting had reason to
know" pass from ordinary damages into consequential damages.
95. That is, both kinds are under "unconscionability" control with respect to limitations. A
sticky question remains, however: Where does an exclusion of consequential damages begin to take
hold if there is no exclusive stated remedy?
96. See, e.g., Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Waterson, 13 Ark. App. 77, 679 S.W.2d 814, 40 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1721 (1984) (consequentials recoverable); R. W. Murray Co. v. Shatter-
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THIRD-PARTY BENEFICIARIES
Perhaps the most interesting case in the period under review is Judge
Pollock's opinion in Spring Motors Distributors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co. 91 for the
Supreme Court of New Jersey. Reversing the New Jersey Appellate Division,
the court first held that recovery of economic loss between sophisticated parties
could not be had in New Jersey in an action for strict liability in tort or
negligence. Warranty liability was the sole source for any such recovery. It then
stated that absence of vertical privity between the ultimate buyer and the maker
of a defective transmission would not bar warranty recovery. Since plaintiff did
not, however, file for a review of the dismissal of its warranty claims as timebarred under U.C.C. section 2-725, there was no recovery.

TITLE, CREDITORS-GOOD FAITH PURCHASERS
AND ENTRUSTING
A case of great potential significance is Placer Coal, Inc. v. Rhondale Coal
Services Co., /nc. 98 In Placer, coal sold to Rhondale was delivered to Placer for
processing and shipment to buyers nominated by Rhondale. In due course,
Rhondale found itself indebted to Placer in the approximate amount of $24,000
and unable to pay sellers from whom it had purchased coal on credit. Placer
filed suit against Rhondale and at the same time sought a prejudgment attachment of the coal in Placer's possession. Before the coal was lawfully seized
pursuant to Placer's attachment, Rhondale informed its sellers that it could not
proof Glass Corp., 758 F.2d 266, 40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1283 (8th Cir. 1985) (same);
Fiorito Bros., Inc. v. Fruehauf Corp., 747 F.2d 1309; 39 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1298 (9th
Cir. 1984) (same); Carboline Co. v. Oxmoor Centers, 40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1728 (Ky.
Ct. App. (1985)) (exclusion remains enforceable in a commercial setting, but a limitation on
incidental damages disappears); Milgard Tempering, Inc. v. Selas Corp. of Am., 761 F.2d 553, 40
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1714 (9th Cir. 1985) and AgriStor Credit Corp. v. Schmidlin, 601
F. Supp. 1307, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1653 (D. Ore. 1985) (both requiring full trial
before such determination can be made).
97. 98 N.J. 555, 489 A.2d 660, 40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1184 (1985). While, due to
the time bar of U.C.C. § 2-725 ( 1978), no warranty issues were technically raised, it is of interest
that the court stated that one issue was "whether the Code provides the exclusive remedies" to the
plaintiff who had suffered only "economic" losses. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N .J.
358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960) and Santor v. A.&M. Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305, 2
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 599 ( 1965) were distinguished as based on factual situations
occurring before New Jersey adopted the U.C.C. and related to consumer transactions. Later strictliability cases were also found to relate to consumer transactions. In Seely v. White Motor Co., 63
Cal. 2d 9, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 403 P.2d 145, 2 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 915 (1965) the court
noted that it had rejected Santor and had emerged as representing the majority view, well liked by
various commentators. The court discusses at length the difference between vertical privity and
horizontal privity, concluding that the Code drafters have left the courts to determine whether
vertical privity should be required in a warranty action, citing among other cases abolishing the
vertical privily bar Kassab v. Central Soya, 432 Pa. 217, 246 A.2d 848 (1968). Judge Handler
concurred, arguing that the majority did not need to go as far on privily as they had done because
the plaintiff had specified to Ford who should make the transmissions, and this should have resulted
in privity between plaintiff and its designated party to supply transmissions.
98. 684 S.W.2d 25, 39 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1697 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984).
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pay for the coal and that they were free to take it back. It was following this
renunciation by Rhondale of its interest in the coal that the attachment on
behalf of Placer became effective.
In a conversion suit brought by the sellers against Placer, recovery was
allowed. The court conceded that title had passed to Rhondale when the coal
was delivered to Placer's dock 99 and that the sellers had failed to comply with
section 2-702(2). 100 But as the court saw it, there is section 2-401 ( 4) that will
cause a revestiture of title in the seller upon "(a] rejection or other refusal by the
buyer to receive or retain the goods, whether or not justified. 101 The court
believed that because Rhondale told the sellers to come and get it before the coal
was taken pursuant to Placer's attachment, it was no longer the property of
Rhondale, and hence, the attachment was wrongful. 102 The dissent, on the other
hand, saw things differently. Judge Gudgel believed that section 2-401 ( 4)
applies only when the goods are rejected because they are in some way deficient,
not when the deficiency relates to the buyer's ability to pay, as here. 103
Because the majority never acknowledged the possibility that the subsection's
scope might be anything other than readily apparent from its language, the
potential effect of the decision is ignored. While it is certainly true that a buyer
has the right to return goods to the seller and that there is a point in the course
of their return when they will no longer be subject to the claims of the buyer's
other creditors, it is questionable whether that point is reached before the goods
leave the buyer's control. To sanction an interest in the seller that is secret so far
as the rest of the world is concerned could have an untoward impact on those
who subsequently deal with the buyer 104 and is at odds with the drafters'
approach in other U.C.C. sections. 105
A case involving a related issue is Big Knob Volunteer Fire Co. v. Lowe &
Moyer Garage, lnc. 106 The Fire Co. contracted to purchase a fire truck and paid
$48,000 toward a purchase price of approximately $52,000. The seller, who
was assembling the truck, had ordered the chassis from Lowe & Moyer. Before
completing the truck, but after painting the Fire Co.'s name on the cab, the
99. The contracts between Rhondale and the sellers provided for delivery of the coal F.O.B.
Placer's dock. Title, therefore, passed to Rhondale when the coal was delivered to Placer. See
u.c.c. § 2-40J(2) (J978).
100. U.C.C. § 2-702(2) (1978) gives a credit seller the right to reclaim goods from an insolvent
buyer if demand for their return is made within J 0 days following their receipt by buyer.
JOI. U.C.C. § 2-40J(4) (J978).
J02. For the attachment to be valid, the property seized must be property of the debtor. See Ky.
Rev. Stat.§ 425.30J (J 984 Cum. Supp.). This would not be the case if title to the coal had returned
to the sellers by operation ofU.C.C. § 2-40J(4) (J978).
J03. 684 S.W.2d at 30-3J, 39 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at J704.
J04. For this reason the law, in the guise of fraudulent conveyance law, has historically
condemned those arrangements resulting in a separation of ownership and possession. See generally
J G. Glenn, Fraudulent Conveyances and Preferences §§ 342-363 (rev. ed. 1940).
JOS. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-402(2) ( J 978) (permitting under certain circumstances the application
of state fraudulent conveyance law to a buyer who leaves sold goods with the seller); § 2-326(3)
(penalizing a consignor's secret interest); § 9-30J (penalizing a secured party's secret interest).
J06. 338 Pa. Super. 257, 487 A.2d 953, 40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) J691 (1985).
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seller found itself unable to pay for the chassis and surrendered the partially
completed truck to Lowe & Moyer. The Fire Co. then filed suit seeking to
replevy the truck.
The Pennsylvania Superior Court correctly observed that the Fire Co. had to
prove that it had a better right to possess the truck than Lowe & Moyer but
incorrectly concluded that that right depended on it being a buyer in ordinary
course under section 2-403(2). 107 Because Lowe & Moyer had passed title to
the chassis to the seller upon delivery to seller, section 2-403(2) was not needed
to create in the seller any power to transfer any interest of Lowe & Hammer to
a third party. 108 They had no interest until they received the surrender. Nevertheless, the opinion nicely summarized the conflicting views on when buyer in
ordinary course status attaches and is for this reason worth reading. The court
eventually decided that identification of the good to the contract is what triggers
buyer status, and the Fire Co. thus qualified when its name was put on the
cab. 109 Confusing the concepts of replevin from the seller and replevin from a
third party, the court then remanded the case to determine whether any effort to
cover by the Fire Co. would have been unavailing. 110 The case again indicates
the conceptual difficulties facing attempts to secure protection for the interests of
a financing buyer outside of compliance with article 9.

RISK OF LOSS
Although at this stage in the life of the U.C.C. it is a bit unusual to find cases
of universal first impression, they still manage to arise. In Jason's Foods, Inc. v.
Peter Eckrich & Sons, Inc., 111 the novel issue facing the Seventh Circuit was
whether section 2-509(2)(b), which provides that when "goods are held by a
bailee to be delivered without being moved, the risk of loss passes to the buyer
... (b) on acknowledgment by the bailee of the buyer's right to possession of the
107. U.C.C. § 2-403(2) (1978) provides: "[a]ny entrusting or possession of goods to a merchant
who deals in goods or that kind gives him power to transrer all rights or the entruster to a buyer in
ordinary course or business." Here, however, title and possession had passed from Lowe & Moyer,
the return was voluntary and would be subject to any rights or the Fire Co.
108. A better approach would have applied U .C.C. § 2-402( 1), which, subject to certain
exceptions, makes the rights or seller's creditors subject to the buyer's rights to recover the goods
under U.C.C. §§ 2-502 and 2-716 {1978). The court does mention § 2-402(1) but rejects its
application because the Fire Co. never raised this theory of recovery. 338 Pa. Super. at 268 n.5, 487
A.2d at 959 n.5, 40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 1698 n.5.
109. Because the truck was not in existence when the contract was made, it was a "foture good"
whose identification occurred when it was designated by the seller as "[the good] to which the
contract refors." U.C.C. § 2-501(1)(b) {1978).
110. u.c.c. § 2-716 (1978) permits replevin "for goods identified to the contract ir arter
reasonable effort [the buyer] is unable to effect cover ... or the circumstances reasonably indicate
that such effort will be unavailing." Because ability to cover is only relevant ir U.C.C. § 2-716 is,
there is no reason for the court to consider its availability in this case. Because U.C.C. § 2-402(1)
(1978) played no role in the decision, see supra note 108, and replevin was not being sought from
the seller, the question or cover seems entirely misplaced.
111. 774 F.2d 214, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1287 (7th Cir. 1985).
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goods," 112 is satisfied if the acknowledgment is made to the seller. 113 In this case,
the subject of the sale, pork ribs, was to be delivered by a transfer of the ribs
from the seller's account in an independent warehouse to the buyer's account.
On J ariuary 13, the change was made pursuant to the seller's instruction, but a
new warehouse receipt was not mailed to the buyer until January 17 or
January 18. It was not until the buyer received the receipt on January 24 that it
knew the transfer had taken place. Unfortunately, the ribs were destroyed by a
fire at the warehouse on January 17. In a suit by the seller to recover the
contract price, the trial court entered summary judgment for the buyer because,
at the time of the fire, the risk of loss had not yet passed.
Unable to justify a result in favor of either party on policy grounds, 114 the
Seventh Circuit affirmed in an opinion characterized by Judge Posner as "a
rather dry textual analysis." 115 Relying on the language of section 2-509(2)(b)
and its surrounding subsections, 116 the U.C.C. comments, and section 2503( 4)(a),117 the court thought that the risk of loss clearly did not pass when the
book transfer was made, even though the seller knew of the transfer. Because
the seller had never raised the point, the court refused to decide when the risk
did pass to the buyer; that is, did "acknowledgment" to the buyer take place
when the receipt was mailed or when it was received? Regardless, the case
serves as stern warning that risk of loss, not the location of title, should control
the decision to insure. 118 It is, therefore, sometimes wise to insure against goods
not owned and perhaps even against goods one does not know are owned.
Section 2-509( 1) sets forth the risk of loss rules that govern if the seller is
required or authorized to ship goods by carrier. Which of its rules apply will, in
turn, depend on the parties' agreement. 119 Frequently they will express their
intention by using standard trade terms or symbols, the consequences of many of
which are spelled out in U.C.C. section 2-320, which instructs that when the

112. U.C.C. § 2-509(2)(b) (1978) (emphasis added).
113. Because the alleged acknowledgment was to the seller, the court raised but did not decide
the question of whether acknowledgment to a third party may ever suffice. 774 F.2d at 217-18, 41
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 1290.
114. The court thought the position of both parties equal from the standpoint of their ability to
prevent or insure against the loss. Id. at 218, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 1292.
115. Id. 774 F.2d at 218, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 1291.
116. u.c.c. § 2-509(2)(b) (1978).
117. This section permits a seller to tender delivery of goods by obtaining the bailee's acknowledgment when the goods are to be delivered without being moved.
118. At the time of the fire, title to the ribs had passed to the buyer. 77 4 F.2d at 217, 41 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 1290. See U.C.C. § 2-401(3)(b) (1978). Another case decided during the
survey period with the same message was Taylor & Martin, Inc. v. Hiland Dairy, Inc., 676 S.W.2d
859, 39 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1672 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984). There it was held that risk of
loss passed even though there was noncompliance with the state certificate of title act and, as a
result, title might not have passed.
119. u.c.c. § 2-509( 1) ( 1978).
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term "C.I.F." is used, the risk of loss passes to the buyer upon shipment. 120 But,
as a recent case illustrates, this presumed agreement is always subject to an
actual agreement otherwise.
In Kumar Corp. v. Nopal Lines, Ltd., 121 the goods were to be shipped from
Miami to Venezuela, C.I.F. Maracaibo, Venezuela. Following their delivery to
the freight handler and their disappearance to ports unknown, the seller
brought suit against the handler, the carrier, and the carrier's shipping agent.
The defendants' position was that the risk of loss had passed to the buyer and
that therefore the buyer, not the seller, was the real party in interest with
standing to sue. Because a C.l.F. contract is ordinarily a shipment contract with
the risk of loss passing to the buyer once the goods are delivered for shipment,
the trial court agreed and granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment.122
According to Florida's Third District Court of Appeals, the case was more
complicated. Contradicting the usual effect of a C.l.F. term was a statement in
the contract that the buyer would not pay until the goods were actually sold in
Venezuela. 123 Because this time-of-payment term made the parties' intentions
ambiguous, the court thought the summary judgment improper. 124 The question
for the trier of fact was whether payment was required only if the goods arrived
in Venezuela 125 or whether it was nonetheless due on the date when the goods
would have arrived had they not been lost. 126 One curious feature of the case is
the failure of the seller to procure insurance. This alone should have prevented
the risk from shifting to the buyer. 127

120. U.C.C. § 2-320 ( 1978), Official Comment 1 ("The C.l.F. contract is not a destination but a
shipment contract with risk of subsequent loss or damage to the goods passing to the buyer upon
shipment if the seller has properly performed all his obligations with respect to the goods").
121. 462 So. 2d 1178, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 69 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
122. Id. at 1183-84, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 73. The trial court also rejected the
seller's argument that it had standing to sue as the buyer's agent. It held that the buyer's purported
ratification of the suit came too late because it was made when an independent claim by the buyer
was time-barred under the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 46 U.S.C. § 1303(6) (1982).
123. Id. at 1184, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 75. U.C.C. § 2-320( 4) ( 1978) provides:
"Under the term C.I.F. or C. & F. unless otherwise agreed the buyer must make payment against
tender of the required documents and the seller may not tender nor the buyer demand delivery of the
goods in substitution for the documents."
124. The court, assuming the risk of loss had passed, also saw no reason why the seller could not
maintain the action as agent of the buyer notwithstanding that the original filing was unauthorized.
In the court's opinion any ratification would relate back and supply the needed authority. Id. at
1185, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 77.
125. A result inconsistent with the nature of a C.l.F. contract.
126. A result consistent with the nature of a C.l.F. contract. See U.C.C. § 2-321(3) (1978).
127. A C.l.F. contract requires the seller to obtain insurance. See U.C.C. § 2-320(2)(c) (1978).
The court did not decide whether an agreement that the buyer could have the goods on consignment
would affect the risk of loss in transit.
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TENDER, CURE, AND NOTICE OF BREACH
Are attorneys' fees recoverable in an indemnity action by a retailer against
the manufacturer of defective goods? The answer apparently is in dispute. 128
The Mississippi Supreme Court held that the retailer's attorneys' fees were not
recoverable in Contractor's Lumber & Supply Co. v. Champion International
Corp. 129 In that case the retailer incurred attorneys' fees defending a claim
against it by its customer. The manufacturer, who had also been sued by the
customer, settled the customer's claims against both itself and the retailer. The
trial court then dismissed the retailer's indemnity claim. The supreme court
affirmed the dismissal upon the ground that the retailer had failed to tender
defense of the customer's claim against it to the manufacturer under section 2607( 5 )(a).130

REPUDIATION AND EXCUSE
In Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Decker Coal Co., 131 a federal district court
stated that a repudiation must be clear and unequivocal. Buyer had the
contractual right to accelerate the delivery date of a coal installment from 1990
to 1985. The buyer demanded acceleration of the delivery date to 1984. The
seller responded that buyer could accelerate the delivery to a date no earlier
than 1986. The seller's response also asked buyer to contact it to discuss the
dispute and agreed to buyer's demand for accelerated delivery of coal under
another contract. According to the court, the seller's response was not an
anticipatory repudiation of its obligation to deliver the coal in 1985. The court
reasoned that even though the seller's response claimed more than the seller was
permitted under the contract, the overall accommodating tone of the letter made
it less than a positive and unequivocal repudiation. 132 Consequently the court
denied buyer's motion for judgment on the pleadings.
In International Minerals and Chemical Corp. v. Llano, Inc.,1 33 the buyer
agreed to pay for certain minimum quantities of natural gas for its fertilizer
plant whether or not it actually used such minimum quantities. Subsequently,
the state promulgated environmental regulations requiring buyer to alter its
manufacturing process so as to use less than the contracted minimum quantities
of gas. In reversing a $3.4-million judgment for seller, the Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit held that the buyer was excused by a contract clause from its
obligation to pay for the contracted minimum quantities. The clause provided in
128. See cases cited in George E. Jensen Contractor, Inc. v. Quality Mill Works, Inc., 431 So.
2d 1232 (Ala. 1983).
129. 463 So. 2d 1084; 40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 481(Miss.1985).
130. The court's reliance upon U.C.C. § 2-607(5)(a) is puzzling. That subsection does not deal
with the substantive right to bring an indemnity action. It deals only with the procedure of binding
the indemnitor to relevant facts found in the claim against the indemnitee. See U.C.C. § 2607(5)(a), Comment 7 (1978); see also U.C.C. § 3-803, Comment (1978).
131. 612 F. Supp. 978, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1703 (N.D. Ill. 1985).
132. See also U.C.C. § 2-610, Comment 2.
133. 770 F.2d 879, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 347 (10th Cir. 1985).
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relevant part, "[I] n the event that . . . [b] uyer is 'unable to receive gas as
provided in this Contract for any reason beyond the reasonable control of the
parties ... an appropriate adjustment in the minimum purchase requirements
... shall be made.' " 134 The court construed the word "unable" in the clause to
mean "impracticable" under U.C.C. section 2-615. It then concluded that
compliance with a supervening state environmental regulation rendered impracticable the buyer's obligation to receive the contracted minimum quantities, thus
triggering an appropriate reduction of the buyer's minimum purchase obligation under the quoted clause. 135 The court rejected the seller's argument that
buyer's voluntary early compliance with the regulation did not constitute
supervening legal impracticability.
A forty percent decrease in the market price of pinto beans was held as a
matter of law not to excuse under U.C.C. section 2-615 a buyer from its fixed
price obligation to purchase such beans in Lawrance v. Elmore Bean Warehouse, lnc. 136 There the contract was between a bean warehouse and grower.
The Idaho Court of Appeals ruled that U.C.C. section 2-615 applied to buyers.
The nonoccurrence of a decline in market price was ruled not a basic assumption upon which this contract was made, however. The court stated that the
basic assumption test was a question of foreseeability. It reasoned that since
changing market conditions were the norm, they usually were foreseeable unless
the party seeking excuse could show that it could operate only at a loss if it were
not excused and that the loss would be so severe and unreasonable that failure to
excuse would result in a grave injustice. The buyer's mere assertion that it
would be driven to bankruptcy if it were not excused was rejected by the court
as not supported by specific facts. 137

REMEDIES

REJECTION AND REVOCATION OF ACCEPTANCE
Does the failure to include a spare tire with a new automobile constitute a
substantial impairment in the value of the automobile so that the buyer can
revoke acceptance of the automobile? The Michigan Supreme Court said it did
in Colonial Dodge, Inc. v. Miller. 138 In reversing both the trial and intermediate
appellate courts, the supreme court applied a subjective test of substantial
impairment 139 and concluded that the test was satisfied on the facts.
The buyer has properly revoked his acceptance for nonconformity under
U.C.C. section 2-608( 1 )(b). Does the seller have the right to an opportunity to
cure the nonconformity? The Alabama Supreme Court held that the seller had
134. Id. at 882, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 350.
135. Id. at 887, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 356-57. See U.C.C. § 2-615(a), Comment
10 (1978).
136. 108 Idaho 892, 702 P.2d 930, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 358 (1985).
137. Id. at 894-95, 702 P.2d at 933, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 362.
138. 420 Mich. 452, 362 N.W.2d 704, 40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1 (1984).
139. See U.C.C. § 2-608, Comment 2 (1978).
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no such right of opportunity to cure in American Honda Motor Co., Inc. v.
Boyd. 140 There, an automobile damaged en route to the United States was
repaired at the port of entry by the manufacturer, then shipped to the dealer
who unwittingly sold the automobile as "new" to the plaintiff. In affirming a
judgment against the manufacturer on an inter alia theory of breach of warranty, the court held that the manufacturer had no right to an opportunity to
cure under U.C.C. section 2-608(1)(b). The court reasoned that because the
subsection said nothing about an opportunity to cure, the manufacturer's claim
that it had a right to attempt cure was not well founded. 141
In a related statutory development, Arizona amended and reenacted the
U.C.C. Among the amendments, a fourth subdivision was added to U.C.C.
section 2-608 providing that the provisions of that section do not apply to a new
motor vehicle subject to Arizona's "lemon law." 142 The effect of this amendment
apparently is to allow a buyer to revoke acceptance only if so permitted under
the lemon law.

RECLAMATION
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Collingwood Grain, Inc. v. Coast
Trading Co., 143 discussed several questions relative to a seller's U.C.C. section
2-702 reclamation rights in bankruptcy. Buyer contracted with three stockyards
to supply them with grain, then entered into two contracts with seller for eight
carloads of grain to fulfill its obligations to the stockyards. The grain was
shipped directly to the stockyards. Buyer paid for the grain with drafts, which
were later dishonored. Within ten days of the seller's deliveries to the stockyards, the buyer petitioned for bankruptcy. Seller obtained payment for two
carloads. It sent notification to the stockyards that it was reclaiming the
remaining grain. The stockyards, in response to competing claims by seller and
buyer, deposited the money owed for the grain with the bankruptcy court. That
court held that seller was entitled to the money. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit
reversed on all but one carload of grain.
First, the court held that U.C.C. section 2-702 applies to ostensible cash
sales. 144 Then it held that the stockyards were bona fide purchasers for value
who took free of seller's reclamation rights pursuant to U.C.C. sections 2-702(3)
and 2-403(1)(b)(c). That the seller delivered directly to the stockyards did not
affect the application of 2-403(1), said the court. Finally, the court held that the
140. 475 So. 2d 835, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 410 (Ala. 1985).
141. Id. at 841, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 413. In his dissent, Chief Justice Torbert
noted that there appears to be a split of opinion, nationwide, on this question. Id. at 841, 41 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. at 414. The cases are collected in 4 R. Anderson, Uniform Commercial Code§ 2-608: 14
& 15 (3d ed. 1983 and Supp. 1985). See also U.C.C. § 2-711, Comment 1 (1978).
142. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 47-26080 (1985 Special Pamphlet). The citation for Arizona's
"lemon law" is Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann.§§ 44-1261 to -1265 (1985 Supp. Pamphlet).
143. 744 F.2d 686, 39 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 753 (9th Cir. 1984).
144. Id. at 689-90, 39 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 356. See U.C.C. § 2-507, Comment 3
(1978).
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seller was not entitled to reclaim under U.C.C. section 2-702 the proceeds of the
grain sales deposited by the stockyards with the bankruptcy court. 145 It held that
the seller's reclamation rights under that section extended only to the goods
themselves, not proceeds of the goods. 146
In In re Storage Technology Corp., 141 a bankruptcy court held that an unpaid
seller seeking reclamation of goods in bankruptcy under Bankruptcy Code
section 546(c) 148 and U.C.C. section 2-702 must show that the debtor was
"insolvent" as that term is defined in the Bankruptcy Code, 149 not as it is defined
in the U.C.C. 150 Section 546(c) protects a reclaiming seller's statutory or
common-law rights from avoidance by the bankruptcy trustee provided, inter
alia, that the debtor received the goods while "insolvent." This language is
similar to that of U.C.C. section 2-702, the seller's statutory right of reclamation. Thus arose the question of whether the drafters used "insolvency" in
section 546(c) in the sense in which it was used in U.C.C. section 2-702 or in
the sense in which it is generally used in the Bankruptcy Code. The court
applied the Bankruptcy Code definition. 151

SELLER'S MONEY REMEDIES
Sellers who finance the acquisition of goods they sell fare poorly in recovering
additional finance charges they incur when their buyers do not pay on time.
Three cases denied recovery, although on different theories. 152
In Associated Metals & Minerals Corp. v. Sharon Steel Corp., 153 the parties
made two contracts for the sale of large quantities of steel slabs for a total price
of approximately $7.4 million. The contracts contained no provisions for inter145. Id. at 690-91, 39 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 756-59. The seller was held entitled to
an administrative priority for the proceeds of one carload of grain because the obligation to deliver
that carload had been executory at the time of bankruptcy. Id. at 692, 39 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) at 760.
146. The court noted that seller had not argued, and so the court did not decide, whether U.C.C.
§ 2-702 creates a security interest cognizable under article 9. Id. at 691, 39 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) at 759. See U.C.C. § 9-113 (1978). Presumably, had the seller so argued, it could then
have argued that it was entitled to the proceeds under U.C.C. § 9-306 (1978).
147. 48 Bankr. 862, 40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1178 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1985).
148. 11U.S.C.§546(c) (1982).
149. The Bankruptcy Code adopts the so-called balance-sheet definition of insolvency (debts
greater than assets) as the sole definition of insolvency. 11U.S.C.§101(29) (Supp. II 1984).
150. The U.C.C. includes the Bankruptcy Code's definition of insolvency in its definition but
also adds the so-called equity definition of insolvency (ceasing to pay debts in ordinary course of
business or inability to pay debts as they become due). See U.C.C. § 1-201(23) (1978).
151. See also In re Furniture Distribs., Inc., 45 Bankr. 38, 40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan)
1276 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1984) (dictum); contra International Crude Corp., Case No. 1-82-00085
(Bankr. N.D. Tex.) (unpublished opinion discussed in the principal case); see generally Mann &
Phillips, Section 546(c) of the Bankruptcy Reform Act: An Imperfect Resolution of the Conflict
Between the Reclaiming Seller and the Bankruptcy Trustee, 54 Am. Bankr. L.J. 239 ( 1980).
152. For cases permitting recovery, see the federal district court's opinion in Associated Metals
& Minerals Corp. v. Sharon Steel Corp., 590 F. Supp. 18, 39 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 892
(S.D.N.Y. 1983), a.ff'd mem. 742 F.2d 1431 (2d Cir. 1983).
153. Id.
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est on late payments. Seller financed its acquisition of the steel apparently at
interest rates far above the legal prejudgment interest rate. Seller delivered the
steel. Buyer paid the contract price, but late. Seller sued to recover $104,000 of
additional financing charges it incurred as a result of buyer's late payments. On
cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court held buyer liable for
only $35,000, the amount of interest on the late payments computed at the legal
prejudgment interest rate. The court, in effect, ruled out recovery of the
additional financing charges as incidental damages under U.C.C. section 2-710
because the buyer already paid the contract price. The court stated that
incidental damages were available under section 2-710 only in conjunction with
specific rights of action recognized by article 2, including a price action. The
court concluded that seller had no such rights of action. A price action was ruled
out by the court on the ground that buyer already had paid the contract price. 154
Next the court held the additional financing charges to be unrecoverable as
consequential damages on the ground that sellers are not entitled to consequential damages under the U.C.C. The court then found buyer liable for prejudgment interest at the legal rate under U.C.C. section 1-103 and applicable
Pennsylvania law. 155 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment without opinion. 156
In MH & H Implement, Inc. v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 151 the parties were a
farm implement manufacturer and a dealer who sold and serviced the manufacturer's products. The dealer encountered financial trouble and went out of
business. The resulting termination of the dealership agreement between the
parties triggered a statutory obligation of the manufacturer to repurchase the
dealer's inventory of parts. The dealer returned its parts to the manufacturer
and, anticipating the manufacturer's payment, borrowed money to wind up its
affairs. 158 The parties disagreed on the amount owed by the manufacturer. The
dealer sued the manufacturer for damages, including the additional interest on
its borrowing that accrued as a result of manufacturer's alleged failure to make
timely payment for the parts. The trial court resolved the payment dispute in
dealer's favor and awarded damages including the additional interest. On
appeal, the Idaho Court of Appeals reversed that part of the judgment awarding
as damages the dealer's additional interest. The court concluded that the interest
154. Id. at 20-21, 39 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 895-96. It is possible that the seller
should have a price action entitling it to incidental damages even when the buyer pays the price late,
for then the buyer has failed "to pay the price as it becomes due." U.C.C. § 2-709(1) (1978).
Otherwise, the situation may arise in which the seller who sues for his or her price is entitled to
incidental damages, but the seller who accepts a late payment of the price before suit forgoes his or
her right to incidental damages caused by the late payment.
155. Id. at 22-23, 39 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 897-98. The court rejected under
U.C.C. § 2-202 buyer's proffered evidence of a course of dealing not to charge interest on late
payments as being inconsistent with specific payment terms set forth in the written contracts.
156. 742 F.2d 1431 (2d Cir. 1983).
157. 108 Idaho 879, 702 P.2d 917, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 467 (1985).
158. The dealer secured its loan by assigning to the lender its right to payment for parts
returned to the manufacturer. Id. at 882, 702 P.2d at 920, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 469.
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expense was not an incidental damage under U.C.C. section 2-710. 159 It distinguished cases cited by the dealer permitting recovery of interest charges arising
when sellers borrowed money to produce or purchase the goods sold. In those
cases, said the court, there was a direct link between the buyer's breach and the
seller's cost. It declared that no such link existed in the principal case because
the dealer borrowed not to acquire the parts sold but to defray general expenses
of winding up the business. The court also concluded that the additional
interest was not recoverable as consequential damages because they were not
shown to have been within the reasonable contemplation of the parties at the
time they entered into the dealership agreement. 160
In Afram Export Corp. v. Metallurgiki Halyps, S.A., 161 the parties negotiated
for the sale of a large quantity of shredded scrap iron at a fixed price. The
market price declined and the sale was never consummated. The seller resold
the scrap and sued for damages, including interest paid on money it had
borrowed to finance the acquisition of junk cars that it shredded to produce the
scrap iron in question. The federal district court found that the parties had
entered into a valid contract that buyer had breached by refusing to take the
scrap. It awarded seller resale damages under U.C.C. section 2-706(1) but
declined to grant seller recovery for interest paid on the money it had borrowed
to finance the acquisition of the scrap. It stated that the interest was not a
consequential damage because the borrowing was not something contemplated
by the parties or foreseen by buyer. The court characterized the interest as
merely a cost of doing business, not an item of incidental damages.
Suppose that a buyer does not cover and its actual loss is much less than
U.C.C. section 2-713 market damages. Are such a buyer's damages limited to its
actual loss? A California Court of Appeals so limited the buyer's damages in
Allied Canners & Packers, Inc. v. Victor Packing Co. 162 There a packing
company contracted to sell raisins to an exporter at a fixed price. The exporter
had entered into two fixed-price resale contracts. Before delivery, the raisin crop
was adversely affected by rains, thus causing an increase in market price.
Packer was unable to obtain raisins from its supplier and breached its contract
with the exporter. Exporter did not cover; however, it managed to have one of
the resale contracts rescinded. The other resale buyer demanded delivery but
never sued the exporter nor did the exporter voluntarily pay any damages to it.
Thus exporter's actual loss was only $4400, its lost profits on the two resale
contracts. Exporter sued packer for approximately $150,000, the market-con159. Id. The court found that the manufacturer's obligation to repurchase was a sale under
U.C.C. § 2-106(1) (1978) so that article 2 applied even though the repurchase obligation was
created by statute.
160. The court did not discuss the rule that sellers are not entitled to consequential damages
under the U.C.C., e.g., Associated Metals & Minerals Corp. v. Sharon Steel Corp., 590 F. Supp.
18, 399 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 892 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), ajf'd mem., 742 F.2d 1431 (2d Cir.
1983).
161. 592 F. Supp. 446, 40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 911 (E.D. Wis. 1984).
162. 162 Cal. App. 3d 905, 209 Cal. Rptr. 60, 39 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1567 (1984).
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tract price differential under U.C.C. section 2-713. The court affirmed the trial
court's judgment limiting the exporter's recovery to its actual loss. 163
Can a buyer recover compensation for the goodwill of its customers lost as a
result of the seller's breach? One case permitted recovery; one case denied it. 164
Damages for buyer's lost customer goodwill were permitted by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in Delano Growers' Cooperative Winery v.
Supreme Wine Co. 165 There a winery sold tainted wine to a bottler who resold
it. Later the bottler received complaints from its customers. Eventually the
bottler liquidated. The winery sued the bottler for the price of the wine and the
bottler counterclaimed for breach of contract. After a bench trial, the court
dismissed the winery's complaint and awarded damages on the bottler's counterclaim, including an amount for loss of goodwill. The case was affirmed on
appeal. The Supreme J udical Court stated that lost goodwill was a recoverable
item of consequential damages under U.C.C. section 2-715 and concluded that
the Joss had been proved with sufficient specificity.
Damages for lost goodwill were denied by a bankruptcy court in In re
Lifeguard Industries, lnc. 166 There a manufacturer sold defective aluminum
siding to an installer. Later the manufacturer went bankrupt and a turnover
complaint was filed against the installer for money owed the manufacturer. The
installer counterclaimed for breach of warranty, seeking as an item of damage
an amount for lost customer goodwill. The court concluded that the claim of lost
goodwill had not been sufficiently proved and in any event was not a recoverable
item even if proved.
Reynolds Metals Co. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp. 167 involved the measure
of damages for the defective installation of a large electric transformer. The
transformer was sold and delivered to buyer, who stored it for almost two years.
Buyer then installed the transformer. Seller's engineer then inspected the
transformer and supervised its start-up. Apparently at this time the engineer did
not properly install a system for detecting internal problems in the transformer.
Less than a year after installation the transformer failed. Buyer paid the seller
$109,000 to repair it. About two years later buyer sued seller based upon the
failure of the transformer. Buyer's claims in negligence, strict liability, and
breach of warranty as to the goods were all dismissed because the applicable
statutes of limitation had expired. Buyer's claim of breach of warranty as to the
services was also dismissed based on what the court found to be an effective
warranty disclaimer. That left only buyer's breach of contract claim as to the
services, which the trial court left to the jury. The jury found for the buyer on
that claim and the court awarded as damages the buyer's cost of repair.

163. See generally Simon & Novack, Limiting the Buyer's Market Damages to Lost Profits: A
Challenge to the Enforceability of Market Contracts, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 1395 ( 1979).
164. See 4 R. Anderson Uniform Commercial Code§ 2-715:42 (3d ed. 1983).
165. 393 Mass. 666, 473 N.E.2d 1066, 40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 93 (1985).
166. 42 Bankr. 734, 39 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1268 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1983).
167. 758 F.2d 1073, 40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1702 (5th Cir. 1985).
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On appeal, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the liability theory
but reversed on the measure of damages. In affirming the liability theory
submitted to the jury, the court distinguished between an improper performance
of service obligations and a complete failure to perform any service obligations.
The former, the court said, was covered by the services warranty disclaimer; the
latter was not. 168 On the measure of damages issue, the court concluded that cost
of repair was not a proper measure of damage here. First, there was a causation
problem. Buyer's own evidence showed that a portion of the transformer
damage was caused by a design defect for which seller was no longer liable. 169
Second, even without the causation problem, the court found that the proper
measure of damage was not cost of repair to restore the failed transformer to
working condition but only what it would have cost to have had the services in
question performed properly in the first place. The court concluded this first by
applying U.C.C. section 2-714 by analogy (because the breach involved services
not goods). It then found the cost of restoring the transformer to be an
unrecoverable consequential damage because of a clause in the contract excluding liability for consequential damages, rather than the measure of damage
under that subsection.

STA TUTES OF LIMITATIONS
The statute of limitations begins to run for most breach of warranty claims
when tender of delivery is made; however, if the warranty "explicitly extends to
future performance of the goods and discovery of the breach must await the time
of such performance," the statute of limitations begins to run only "when the
breach is or should have been discovered." 170 The distinction between ordinary
warranties and "future performance" warranties has produced much litigation.
This year has been no different. A sampling of the more interesting cases
follows.
In Allis-Chalmers Credit Corp. v. Herbolt, 111 an Ohio Appeals Court decided
inter alia that the usual "repair or replace" limitation of remedy clause was not
a future performance warranty. 172 The case involved a breach of warranty claim
by a farmer against a combine manufacturer, apparently to recover for economic
loss, not personal injuries or property damage.

168. Seller argued that the contract term mandating seller's inspection and start-up services had
been included for the seller's benefit so that it was seller's "right," not an "obligation." The court
commented favorably upon this argument. Ultimately the court did not entertain the argument,
because it had not been raised at trial. Id. at 1078, 40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 1710-11.
169. Id. at 1077 n.6, 40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 1709 n.6.
170. U.C.C. § 2-725(2) (1978); see also U.C.C. § 2-725(1) (1978).
171. 17 Ohio App. 3d 230, 479 N.E.2d 293, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 485 (1984).
172. The cases are not in agreement on this point. For a collection of some of the conflicting
cases see 5 R. Anderson, Uniform Commercial Code§ 2-725:95 (3d ed. 1983 and Supp. 1985).
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In Economy Housing Co. v. Continental Forest Products, lnc., 113 the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals applied a Nebraska Supreme Court decision 174 that
held that the description of goods as "siding" created a warranty that extended
explicitly to future performance. In reversing summary judgment for the seller,
the Eighth Circuit ruled that in light of the buyer's description of the goods in
its complaint, there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the
limitations period had run.
The statute of limitations for wari:anty actions other than future performance
warranty actions begins to run "when tender of delivery is made." 176 When a
consumer sues a remote seller such as a distributor the question arises whether
the statute begins to run upon the distributor's tender of delivery to its buyer or
upon the tender of delivery to the consumer. In Heller v. United States Suzuki
Motor Corp., 176 the New York State Court of Appeals held that the statute
begins upon the distributor's tender of delivery to its buyer. In that case, the
consumer sued in warranty 177 a distributor and the retailer three years and
seven months after the consumer was injured in a motorcycle accident. The
consumer had purchased the motorcycle from the retailer three years and ten
months prior to the suit. The distributor had tendered delivery to its immediate
purchaser four years and ten months before suit. 178 The distributor asserted the
statute of limitations as a defense. It moved for summary judgment arguing that
the relevant tender of delivery was its tender to its immediate purchaser, and
Special Term denied the motion and dismissed the distributor's statute of
limitations defense. The Appellate Division reversed and dismissed the consumer's claim against the distributor.
On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed 179 the order of the Appellate
Division. The court held the relevant tender under U.C.C. section 2-725(2) to
be the distributor's tender to its immediate purchaser. Thus, the consumer's
claim against the distributor was time-barred. 180
In Dowling v. Southwestern Porcelain, lnc.,' 81 the Kansas Supreme Court
held that the statute of limitations began to run only upon installation of a silo,
not upon delivery of its component parts to the buyer. 182 There the buyer
173. 757 F.2d 200, 40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 823 (8th Cir. 1985).
174. Moore v. Puget Sound Plywood, Inc., 214 Neb. 14, 332 N.W.2d 212, 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 82 ( 1983 ).
175. u.c.c. § 2-725(2) (1978).
176. 64 N.Y.2d 407, 477 N.E.2d 434, 40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 917 (1985).
177. The consumer's tort claims were barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Id. at 409,
477 N.E. 2d at 435, 40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 917.
178. This distributor tendered delivery to another distributor who in turn sold the motorcycle to
the retailer. Id. at 409-10, 477 N.E.2d at 435, 40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 918.
179. Two judges dissented.
180. For cases holding that the statute does not begin to run until tender of delivery to the
consumer, see Judge Meyer's dissent. 64 N.Y.2d at 417, 477 N.E.2d at 440, 40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) at 925.
181. 237 Kan. 536, 701P.2d954, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 127 (1985).
182. The case law apparently is not in accord on this point. See the cases discussed in the
principal case.
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purchased a high-moisture grain silo from a dealer who was also to install it.
The manufacturer shipped the silo directly to the buyer. Two months later the
dealer completed installation. Subsequently the dealer went bankrupt and was
dissolved. The silo leaked, so the manufacturer had another of its dealers
attempt to repair the leaks, apparently unsuccessfully. Buyer sued the manufacturer on a variety of theories, including breach of warranty. Suit was filed
within four years of the silo's installation but not within four years of its
delivery. The trial court granted summary judgment for the manufacturer upon
the grounds that the installing dealer was not an agent of the manufacturer and
that the statute of limitations had expired.
On appeal, the Kansas Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case. It
concluded that the buyer's warranty suit had been timely filed, because U.C.C.
section 2-725(1) had begun to run only upon the installation of silo. The court
gave essentially three reasons for its decision. First, the buyer had contracted for
an installed silo. Second, the manufacturer had an interest in the quality and
control of the installation. 183 Third, the buyer could not test the silo to determine
whether it was acceptable until after installation.
Buyers often argue that unsuccessful repair attempts extend the time within
which the buyers must sue. 184 Their arguments have been about as successful as
their seller's repair attempts. Of five such cases, only one permitted the buyer to
recover.
In Ranker v. Skyline Corp., 185 the Pennsylvania Superior Court did not
permit recovery. The buyer had purchased a travel trailer that leaked. Seller
made several good faith attempts at repair over a two- to three-year period.
Buyer filed suit against the manufacturer four years and one month after he had
taken initial delivery of the trailer. The manufacturer demurred asserting the
statute of limitations. The trial court accepted the demurrer and dismissed
buyer's complaint. On appeal the superior court affirmed. First, the court stated
that the manufacturer's standard repair warranty did not constitute a future
performance warranty. Next, it held that even if the repair warranty had been a
future performance warranty, dismissal was proper because the buyer had not
sued until more than four years after he had discovered the defect. Finally, the
court held that the manufacturer's unsuccessful attempts at repair did not estop
it from asserting the statute of limitations. Two elements were necessary for
estoppel, said the court: attempts at repair and a representation that the repairs
would correct the defect. The buyer failed to aver that the manufacturer had
183. The manufacturer's interest in the quality and control of the installation was evidenced by
several facts: the installing dealer was commencing business in territory in which a competitor was
already entrenched. The dealership agreement had provided for the purchase by the dealer of
expensive erection equipment from the manufacturer and for training of the dealer's erection and
service people by the manufacturer. 237 Kan. at 543-44, 701 P.2d at 960, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) at 132.
184. See generally, Kanovitz, The Seller Fiddles and the Clock Ticks: Seller's Cure and the
U.C.C. Statute of Limitations, 60 Notre Dame L. Rev. 318 (1985).
185. 342 Pa. Super. 510, 493 A.2d 706, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 476 (1985).
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made any such representation. Thus the complaint was defective and properly
dismissed.
In Laurita v. International Harvester, 186 the only case to permit the buyer to
avoid the statute of limitations, a Pennsylvania Common Pleas court found both
elements of estoppel to be alleged. Thus the court denied the manufacturer's
motion for judgment on the pleadings.
In New England Power Co. v. Riley Stoker Corp., 181 the manufacturer
designed, built, and installed two sophisticated boilers for buyer. The boilers did
not function properly. Eventually after several years of repeated repair attempts, the manufacturer ceased to make attempts to repair. Two years after
this, and at least five years after delivery of the last boiler, the buyer sued the
manufacturer for inter alia breach of warranty. The manufacturer asserted the
statute of limitations and moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted
that motion. On appeal, the Massachusetts Appeals Court affirmed. It held, as
had the Ranker court, that the manufacturer's repair warranty did not extend
the time within which the buyer had to sue. On the estoppel issue, the court
characterized the manufacturer's efforts to repair as nothing more than "honest,
genuine repair efforts" and as such insufficient to work an estoppel.
In Nelligan v. Tom Chaney Motors, /nc.,' 88 the consumer buyer of a defective
automobile argued that the seller's conduct in attempting to repair was a
warranty explicitly extending to future performance. Her warranty claims were
dismissed as time-barred. On appeal, an Illinois appellate court affirmed. It
stated that the repair conduct could, at best, give rise only to an implied, not an
explicit warranty.
In Peerless Pump v. Blythe-Vanguard Construction Corp., 189 the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York held a buyer's warranty
counterclaim to be time-barred under New York law. The case involved the
manufacture of effluent pumps to buyer's specifications. The court held the
contract to be one for goods, not services, so that the U.C.C. four-year, not the
general contract six-year, statute of limitations applied. It further held the
contract to be for delivery only, not installation, so that buyer's claim accrued
upon delivery. In passing, the court noted that attempts to repair did not, as a
matter of Jaw, toll the statute of limitations.

BULK SALES
Article 6 of the U.C.C. has not produced much litigation in the period under
review. The Texas Court of Civil Appeals in San Antonio was, however, faced
with deciding Texas's stand on the issue of what constitutes the "concealment"
that would toll the six-month statute of limitations in U.C.C. section 6-111 until
186.
Fayette
187.
188.
189.

32 Pa. D. & C. 3d 563, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 133 (Pa. Court Common Pleas,
Co. 1983 ).
20 Mass. App. Ct. 25, 477 N.E.2d 1054, 40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1735 (1985).
133 Ill. App. 3d 798, 479 N.E.2d 439, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 480 (1985).
40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 494 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
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the discovery of the transfer. 190 One set of authorities has held that affirmative
efforts to conceal the transfer must be shown. 191 The contrary rulings find
concealment in a complete failure to comply with the notice provisions of article
6. 192 In the Texas case, the record showed three occasions within a month of the
transfer on which the party claiming "concealment" had dealt with the transferee, and on one occasion its employee had been requested to change an invoice
to reflect the transferee as the purchaser. 193 The court rejected "the notion that
mere failure to give the written notice required by the Act [article 6] amounts to
concealment as a matter of law." The court held "that concealment as contemplated by § 6-111 occurs when the record discloses affirmative efforts at concealing the transaction and when there has been complete and total failure to
comply with the notice provisions of the statute." 194
The timing here is close. Exact dates are not given in the opinion, the court
merely stating that suit was filed when "almost seven months had elapsed from
the date of the transfer." 195 Hence the court, in referring to posttransfer
transactions, must have treated them as indicating no affirmative effort to
conceal.
The committee to propose a redraft of article 6 to the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 196 has been meeting. While no decisions
have been made, discussions indicate some desire on the part of some members
to expand the coverage to include voluntary liquidations, and to impose some
duties on auctioneers who conduct bulk sales. There is also discussion of
exempting small transactions. Instead of limiting coverage to enterprises selling
goods from stock, there is discussion of defining a bulk sale in terms of a sale of
moveable assets of the transferor. Moveable assets would by definition include
190. SVM Invs. v. Mexican Exporters, Inc., 685 S.W.2d 424, 40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 1017 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985).
191. The court cited Aluminum Shapes, Inc. v. K-A Liquidating Co., 290 F. Supp. 356, 5
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1194 (W.D. Pa. 1968); Chas. Adler & Son, Inc. v. DiNunzio, 5
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 743 (Pa. Court Common Pleas 1967); Areolineas Argentinas v.
Hansen & Yorke Co., Inc., 12 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 329 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1973)
(dictum); cf Lang v. Graham (Jn re Borba), 736 F.2d 1317, 38 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan)
1714 (9th Cir. 1984); Chartered Bank of London v. Diamant (Jn re Del Norte Depot, Inc.), 716
F.2d 557, 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1415 (9th Cir. 1983). Also cited was 2 W. Hawkland,
A Transactional Guide to the Uniform Commercial Code§ 3.03 at 846 (1964).
192. Cited were E. J. Trum, Inc. v. Blanchard Parfums, Inc., 33 A.D.2d 689, 306 N.Y.S.2d
316, 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1261 (1969); see also McKissick v. Foremost-McKesson,
Inc., 441 F.2d 811, 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 301 (5th Cir. 1971) (dictum); Columbian
Rope Co. v. Rinek Cordage Co., 314 Pa. Super. 585, 461 A.2d 312, 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 922 (1983). As supporting this result, the court referred to 3A R. Dusenberg & L.
King, Sales and Bulk Transfers Under the Uniform Commercial Code§ 15.07 (1984); J. White &
R. Summers, Uniform Commercial Code§ 19-3 (2d ed. 1980).
193. SVM Investments v. Mexican Importers, 685 S.W.2d at 429, 40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) at 1021.
194. Id. at 428, 40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 1021.
195. Id., 40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 1019.
196. Following its usual procedure, the National Conference has appointed Chancellor William
Hawkland as reporter, a committee of commissioners, and a group of advisers.
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such things as customer lists, accounts, and the like. Thus, if these views prevail,
all sales of any business would be included, unless coming within one of several
exemptions. 197

DOCUMENTS OF TITLE
The cases under article 7, only occasionally discussed in this survey, did cover
five areas worth mentioning briefly.
Two cases discussed whether, in interstate shipments, the U.C.C. supplied a
source for federal law. 198 Judge Haight in the Southern District of New York
held that the Carmack Amendment 199 to the LC.A. Act applied to freight
forwarders and required dismissal of claims against a carrier for negligent
actions. All such must be in contract and hence subject to tariff limitations
unless the shipper can identify a general duty not dependent on the contract,
and a breach thereof. The Eighth Circuit 200 held that the recent deregulation of
air carriers did not make the U.C.C. a source of federal law for interstate
shipments in which well-developed pre-U.C.C. federal law provided a rule for
decision. Hence an exclusion of liability in a shipper's contract with Federal
Express did not enure to the benefit of Great Western Air Lines, an agent
carrier. For this to happen pre-U.C.C. federal law required that the agent
carrier be expressly made a beneficiary of that contract or be a party to it. 201
Shortened contractual times for filing claims and instituting legal action were
involved in three cases. Unlike the rule in New York that an action for
conversion is not subject to contractual time bars, 202 the cases in the Fourth
Circuit applying Maryland law, 203 Seventh Circuit under Illinois law, 20 • and in
the New Jersey Court of Appeals 205 held that, although conversion was ex197. In addition to the exemption of small transactions under consideration, attention is being
given to transactions in which a solvent buyer assumes all debts of which the buyer has notice.
Various measures are being discussed to protect those whose debts are not assumed by the buyer.
198. Arkwright-Boston Mfrs. Mutual Ins. Co. v. Great W. Airlines, Inc., 767 F.2d 425, 41
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 962 (8th Cir. 1985) and Starmakers Publishing Corp. v. Acme Fast
Freight, Inc., 615 F. Supp. 787, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 967 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
199. 49U.S.C.§11707, amending the Interstate Commerce Act, 49U.S.C.§§10101-11917
(1982).
200. Arkwright, 767 F.2d at 425, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 962.
201. Id. at 427, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 965, citing Robert C. Herd & Co. v. Krawill Mach.
Co., 359 U.S. 297, 303, 305 (1959).
202. I.C.C. Metals Inc. v. Municipal Warehouse Co., 50 N.Y.2d 657, 409 N.E.2d 849, 431
N.Y.S.2d 372, 29 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 217 (1980).
203. Phillips Bros. v. Locust Indus., Inc., 760 F.2d 523, 40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 606
(4th Cir. 1985 ).
204. Refrigerator Sales Co., Inc. v. Mitchell-Jackson, Inc., 770 F.2d 98, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 955 (7th Cir. 1985).
205. Amenip Corp. v. Ultimate Distrib. Sys., Inc., 200 N.J. Super. 100, 490 A.2d 371, 40
V.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1367 (1985). Applying New Jersey law, the Second Circuit, in
Natural Resources Trading, Inc. v. Trans Freight Lines, 766 F.2d 65, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 948 (2d Cir. 1985), ruled that New Jersey law created a presumption of conversion,
but U.C.C. § 7-204(3) (1978) was not involved.
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eluded from damage limitation under U.C.C. section 7-204(2), 206 no such
exclusion was specified in U.C.C. section 7-204(3) on shortening the time for
suit. The holdings were that actions for damage or nondelivery were necessarily
based on the bailment. 207
While U.C.C. section 7-204(2) permits limitation of liability for negligence
unless a higher fee is paid for greater declared value, in Allstate Insurance Co. v.
Winnebago County Fair Ass'n, Inc. 208 the court first held a county fair to be a
warehouse as to equipment stored. In the holding, combining U.C.C. section 1102(3) with U.C.C. section 7-204(2), the ruling was that liability for negligence
could not be totally disclaimed as the court below had ruled. Since there was no
stated monetary limit, would full negligence damages be recoverable on demand? For monetary limits, will courts develop some theory requiring a "fair
quantum" of damages? 209
When there is an unexplained disappearance from the warehouse, and hence
a failure to deliver, Judge Posner, in Refrigeration Sales Co. v. MitchellJackson, Inc.,2 10 noted a difference in the resulting presumption. Some courts,
led by New York, presume conversion 211 and thus eliminate limitations of
liability due to the more culpable nature of that tort. Others, presuming
negligence, 212 then permit limitation of liability.
It is not clear whether the distinction has any effect on the evidence necessary
to overcome the presumption. Judge Posner's Seventh Circuit panel apparently
opted for negligence but stated that even if the presumption were conversion, the
warehouseman's evidence was enough to rebut the presumption. Since the lower
court granted summary judgment because the action was time-barred by the
clause just discussed, it is difficult to see why the rebutting of the presumption
206. U.C.C. § 7-204(2) (1978) excludes from the clause permitting warehouseman to limit
damages only when a warehouse converts to its own use. In the examples of conversion in Judge
Posner's opinion in Refrigerator Sales Co., Inc., 770 F.2d at 98, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 955, the
learned judge, although he does not say so, appears to emphasize the "to his own use." Hence he
would only presume negligence in the event of an unexplained failure to deliver.
207. The limiting words in U.C.C. § 7-204(3) (1978) on shortening the time for bringing
actions require that the actions be "based on the bailment." In l.C.C. Metals, Inc., 50 N.Y.2d at
657, 409 N.E.2d at 849, 431 N.Y.S.2d at 372, 29 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 217, the New
York court felt that a conversion to one's own .use destroyed the bailment and the action was based
on the tort.
208. 131 Ill. App. 3d 225, 475 N.E.2d 230, 40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1361 (1985).
209. See U.C.C. § 2-719, Comment 1 (1978).
210. See 50 N.Y.2d at 657, 409 N.E.2d at 849, 431 N.Y.S.2d at 372, 29 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) at 217.
211. Citing l.C.C. Metals, Inc. v. Municipal Warehouse Co., id. Joseph H. Reinfeld, Inc. v.
Griswold & Bateman Warehouse, Inc., 189 N.J. Super. 141, 458 A.2d 1341, 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 262 (1983) and National Resources Trading, Inc. v. Trans Freight Lines, 766 F.2d at
65, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 948.
212. Lerner v. Brettschneider, 123 Ariz. 152, 598 P.2d 515 (Ct. App. 1979); Sanfisket, Inc. v.
Atlantic Cold Storage Corp., 347 So. 2d 647, 21 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1155 (Fla. App.
1977); Adams v. Ryan & Christie Storage, Inc., 563 F. Supp. 409, 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 930 (E.D. Pa. 1982) ajfd mem., 725 F.2d 666 (3d Cir. 1983). See also Frissell v. John
W. Rogers, Inc., 141 Conn. 308, 106 A.2d 162 (1954).
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was discussed. As summarized by Judge Posner as "barely enough in the case of
the missing goods," that evidence was "an explanation, not implausible in the
circumstances-a large warehouse, a reputable owner, some goods returned
damaged, a long course of dealing between the parties." 213
Elsewhere it appears that the employee in charge stated that "he thought ...
[that the missing containers] had been returned ... as empties" to the depositor.214
Far more stringent is the Connecticut rule for rebutting the presumption of
negligence as applied by New York's Appellate Division, First Department, 210
holding that Connecticut law required the warehouseman to prove something
more than circumstances indicating the immediate cause of the damage. "The
proof must go so far as to establish what, if any, human conduct materially
contributed to that immediate cause." 216 Thus plaintiff, the assignee of the
depositor, won a summary judgment on liability.
Each of the last two cases has one other facet. The Seventh Circuit panel
ruled that the time-bar clause in the warehouse receipt also protected the
warehouseman's employee in charge from individual liability. 217
In the New York case, the matter was remanded so "that plaintiff should be
given an opportunity to present additional facts, if there should be any, that
would raise a factual issue as to whether there was a legally binding contractual
agreement limiting liability." 218 This despite a signed warehouse receipt for art
objects containing a clause limiting liability to thirty cents per pound.
The Innocent Agent rule of U.C.C. section 7-404, in United States v. New
Holland Sales Stable, Inc., 219 even if applicable, would not have protected
commission merchants from liability to FmHA, a secured party, as they had not
observed reasonable commercial standards in that they "never conducted a lien
search or even contacted the County Supervisor Freeman to determine the status
of the cattle sold despite the fact that the Nolls' [the actual sellers] name was on
a list circulated by the FmHA". 220 "Commercial standards" apparently equal
213. 770 F.2d at 102, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 960.
214. Id. at 100, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 956.
215. Hacohen v. Bolliger, Ltd., 108 A.D.2d 357, 489 N.Y.S.2d 75, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 1404 (1st Dept. 1985 ).
216. Id. 108 A.D.2d at 361, 489 N.Y.S.2d at 78, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 1406,
citing Griffin v. Nationwide Moving & Storage Co., 187 Conn. 405, 446 A.2d 799, 802, 34 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 970 (1982).
217. See Refrigeration Sales Co., Inc., 770 F.2d at 103, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at
961. The rationale was,
The bailee would indemnify its employee for any judgment paid in such a suit, or if not would
have to pay the employee a higher wage to compensate him for bearing the risk of such a suit
and either way the burden of the suit would come to rest on the bailee despite the limitation
clause.
The reasoning is that of "law and economics" and not very realistic.
218. 108 A.D.2d at 362, 489 N.Y. Supp. 2d at 79, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 1407.
219. 603 F. Supp. 1379, 40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 715 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
220. Id. at 1387, 40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 725.
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the conduct expected of a lawyer giving an opinion. Is U.C.C. section 7-404 to
have the fate of U.C.C. section 3-419(3)?
The New York Truth in Storage Act, 221 awarding successful plaintiffs treble
damages and recovery of attorneys' fees, applies only to unlawful detention and
not to loss by negligence, according to the New York City court. 222

221. N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law§ 605-610 (McKinney 1984).
222. Copeland v. Schwartz Moving & Storage Corp., 483 N.Y.S.2d 945, 40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 605 (1985).
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